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THE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL NON-TAX LIENS:
ALTERNATIVES TO AN ARCHAIC DOCTRINE
Traditionally the federal government, as a lienholder, has been fa-
vored by the courts over competing state and local lienholders. Absent
federal statutes to the contrary, it has been the beneficiary of a federal
common law rule which makes the priority of federal liens a virtual
certainty. The federal common law rule simply states that "the first in
time is the first in right."' However, for a state or local lien to be "first
in time," it must be perfected in the sense that it is definite and not
merely ascertainable in the future. 2 Whether such a lien is definite is
determined by a three-part test known as the choate lien doctrine. 3 The
test requires that the identity of the lienor must be known, the property
subject to the lien must be known, and the amount payable must be
fixed beyond any possibility of change.4 The fact that individual states
have created a different set of priorities for liens, more protective of
non-federal lienholders, is of little significance. The presence of a fed-
eral lien creates a federal question and federal law is determinative.
5
The federal priority has not escaped criticism. Federal courts
which have ultimately upheld the common law rule have recognized
the inequities that result from its application. 6 Other courts have com-
pletely rejected the rule. 7 Commentators applauded the changes made
in the priority system of federal tax liens through the Tax Lien Act of
1966.8 However, one commentator referred also to "the unfinished
1. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
2. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
3. The name is taken from Burroughs, The Choate Lien Doctrine, 1963 DUKE L.J. 429.
4. 329 U.S. at 375.
5. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
6. See Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588
(7th Cir. 1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (Ist Cir. 1978).
7. See United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977); Hayden v. Prevatte, 327 F.
Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1971); Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), af'd sub nom. Ault v.
United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit again rejected the
rule, but relied heavily upon a statute to reach its holding in United States v. California-Oregon
Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1975). Several other courts have rejected the rule in part.
See Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977); Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 446 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
8. See Creedon, The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966-An Historic Breakthrough, 4 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 161 (1967); Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW 271 (1967); Young,
Priority of The Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 723 (1967); Note, Choateness and the 1966
federal Tax LienAct, 52 MINN. L. REV. 198 (1967), discussing Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125
(1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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business, the problem areas. . . ."9 Many of the problem areas con-
cerned federal non-tax liens, against which competing state and local
liens found little if any statutory relief.'0 The commentator recom-
mended that the federal common law rule should be modified at least
to the same extent that the common law of tax liens had been changed
by the Tax Lien Act."I
Today the business remains unfinished. Congress has failed to act,
and the United States Supreme Court has not decided a case in the
area. Further, although the inequities of that rule are obvious, the
majority of federal courts of appeals continue to follow the federal
common law rule.'
2
This note will begin by examining the federal common law rule.
The development of the rule will be traced from its initial application
in the area of tax liens to its more recent application in the area of non-
tax liens. A discussion will follow of a particular problem in the non-
tax lien area, namely liens arising out of federally insured mortgages.
The discussion will examine the policy reasons behind protecting those
liens at the expense of competing mechanic's liens, and will conclude
with recommendations for a more equitable rule.
THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW RULE
The priority of federal liens is determined by a simple rule, and a
more troublesome corollary. The rule is stated as, "The first in time is
the first in right."' 3 It was adopted from the early common law by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Rankin v. Scott. 14 The case
9. Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 228
(1967).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 294.
12. Six federal circuit courts of appeals continue to retain the federal common law rule. See
Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.
1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. General MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1972); T.H. Rogers
Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398
(3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957).
Two federal circuit courts of appeals have rejected the rule. See United States v. Crittenden,
563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977); Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), affidsub nom. Ault
v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). The federal district court in South
Carolina has rejected the rule. See Hayden v. Prevatte, 327 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1971). The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has retained the rule, but it has decided only cases where
the debtor, upon whose property the liens attached, was insolvent. See H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc.
v. Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968).
In all other cases cited herein the debtor was solvent. This may make a meaningful difference in
the rule which is applied. See text accompanying notes 103-23 infra. The Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit have never decided a case in the area.
13. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
14. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827).
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was an action of ejectment brought by Scott, who had purchased prop-
erty at a judicial sale. The property had been sold to satisfy a judgment
entered in March, 1822, against the estate of Little. Prior to that, in
April, 1821, a judgment had been rendered against the estate of Little
in favor of Schatzell, the landlord of Rankin. At the time of the second
judgment and the sale to Scott, execution had not yet issued on
Schatzell's judgment. Shortly thereafter the same premises were sold to
Schatzell. The question before the Court was whether the second judg-
ment in favor of Scott and subsequent execution divested the lien of the
first judgment. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall reponded:
The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a
prior claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it
binds, unless the lien be intrinsically defective, or be displaced by
some act of the party holding it, which shall postpone him in a Court
of law or equity to a subsequent claimant.
1 5
Thus Schatzell's lien was entitled to priority notwithstanding the fact
that Scott was the first to perfect his lien.'
6
In a contest where the first in time prevails, the date on which a
lien arises is crucial. A problem exists where that date may be chosen
from one of several possibilities. Mechanic's liens provide a good ex-
ample. In the state of Washington the lien of a mechanic attaches
when he begins his particular work.' 7 In California, all mechanic's
liens date back to the beginning of the particular construction job. 18 In
Illinois, mechanic's liens attach as of the date on which the construction
contract is signed.' 9 Thus a lien competing with a mechanic's lien
could be entitled to priority in Washington but not in California and
Illinois under the same set of facts.
Where one of the competing liens is a federal lien this problem is
avoided by a judicially created corollary to the first in time rule. The
corollary is applied uniformly regardless of the state in which the prop-
erty interest is located, and requires that a state or local lien must sat-
isfy certain prerequisites before it is recognized as having arisen for
purposes of the first in time rule. When a lien meets these require-
ments, it is considered to be perfected 20 or choate.21 This test, referred
15. Id. at 179.
16. Id. at 180.
17. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.050 (Supp. 1977).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 16 (1977).
20. A fully perfected lien is one which is definite and not merely ascertainable in the future.
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). A lien is perfected when there is
nothing more to be done to create a choate lien. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 355
(1964).
21. The word choate was derived from the word inchoate which means incomplete. It is used
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to as the choate lien doctrine,22 requires: (1) the identity of the lienor
must be known,23 (2) the property subject to the lien must be known,
24
and (3) the amount payable must be fixed beyond any possibility of
change.25 A state or local lien prevails only if it meets the three re-
quirements before the federal lien arises.
26
The identity of the lienor is not difficult to ascertain since the lie-
nor is usually a party to the contest. The identity of the property sub-
ject to the lien and the amount of the lien present far greater problems.
The United States Supreme Court's analysis of the final two require-
ments in United States v. Texas27 serves as a good example of the ob-
stacle to choateness that they provide.
In United States v. Texas,28 a manufacturer and distributor of fuel
oil became insolvent and a receiver was appointed. Among his credi-
tors were the United States to whom he owed federal gasoline taxes,
and the state of Texas, to whom he owed state gasoline taxes. The
amount of the federal lien was great enough so that if the United States
was given priority, nothing would be left to apply to the Texas claim.
The lien of the United States attached on the day the debtor went into
receivership. Texas argued that according to state law its lien was per-
fected on the day the state gasoline taxes became due, making its lien
prior in time.29 The Supreme Court noted that Texas had made no
move to assert its statutory lien prior to the appointment of the receiver.
Thus the Court had to decide whether the statutory lien standing alone,
without any further action on the part of the state, created a perfected
lien. The statute provided that the state lien would attach only to prop-
to describe a lien in which the creditor has nothing more to do in order to assert his right to the
property. Professor Plumb has described the word as "an illegitimate back formation which was
not in most dictionaries until the Supreme Court gave it currency." Plumb, Federal Liens and
Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 230 (1967). As used in this sense the
word is interchangeable with the word "perfected" for the purpose of describing a lien.
22. The name is taken from Burroughs, The Choate Lien Doctrine, 1963 DUKE L.J. 429.
23. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
24. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
25. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
26. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
27. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
28. Id.
29. The statute in question read:
All taxes, fines, penalties and interest due by any distributor to the State shall be a pre-
ferred lien, first and prior to any and all other existing liens, upon all of the property of
any distributor, devoted to or used in his business as a distributor, which property shall
include refinery, blending plants, storage tanks, warehouses, office buildings and equip-
ment, tank trucks or other motor vehicles, or any other property devoted to such use, and
each tract of land on which such refinery, blending plant, tanks or other property is
located, or which is used in carrying on such business.
TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7065a-7 (Vernon 1933) (current version at TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art.
10.17 (Vernon 1969)).
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erty used in the insolvent's business. Texas contended that the statute
determined the identity of the property affected by the lien with suffi-
cient specificity. The Court disagreed. It held that property devoted to
the insolvent's business was "neither specific nor constant." 30 Thus the
lien failed to fulfill the second requirement.
Texas' lien also failed to satisfy the third requirement, that the
amount of the lien must be definite. The Court reached this conclusion
in spite of the fact that the tax reports of the debtor himself showed that
he was $40,312.51 in arrears on his state gasoline tax. In addition a
Texas statute provided that tax reports were prima facie evidence as to
the amount of taxes owed.31 The Court held that this was not sufficient
to fix the amount payable beyond any possibility of change since the
statute also provided that any inaccuracy in the tax reports could be
shown, thereby defeating the presumption of their validity.32 There-
fore, the Court in effect said that the amount of the lien could not be
definite until it had been reduced to judgment.
The choate lien doctrine has presented extraordinary difficulties
for lienors. In order to fix the amount payable, a lienor, with a few
exceptions, 33 must have pursued the lien to judgment before the United
States established its lien. Such was the case in United States v.
Texas.34 Even if a lien is fully perfected under state law, it will be
junior to a federal lien if it fails to meet the rigorous standards of the
choate lien doctrine. This is because federal priority is a federal ques-
tion. In the absence of federal statutes, priority is governed by the fed-
eral common law. 35
The Rise of the Choate Lien Doctrine
The choate lien doctrine evolved through the judicial interpreta-
30. 314 U.S. at 487.
31. TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7065a-8(d) (Vernon 1933) (current version at TEX. TAX-GEN.
ANN. art. 10.16 (Vernon 1969)).
32. 314 U.S. at 488.
33. Certain possessory liens such as the artisan's lien are fixed or specific. See United States
v. Toys of the World Club, Inc., 288 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1961). Unlike a materialman's lien, the
amount of the artisan's lien need not be litigated since the amount is fixed as the value of the
property possessed. This difference is recognized in section 9-310 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Certain state and local tax liens assessed for a particular amount and attached to particular
property might also satisfy the standard. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81
(1954). However, where the tax lien does not attach to particular property it remains a general or
inchoate lien. Such was the case in Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946)
(insolvent company owed the state unemployment compensation contributions; the amount owed
was fixed, but since the debtor had not filed a schedule of assets, the lien could not attach to
specific property).
34. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
35. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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tion of an insolvency priority statute, Revised Statute 3466,36 enacted
during the early years of our nation's history.37 The statute provides
that "[w]henever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent
.. .the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied. ' 38 On its
face Revised Statute 3466 creates an absolute priority in favor of debts
owed to the United States. It is to be contrasted with bankruptcy insol-
vency proceedings under the bankruptcy provisions of the United
States Code.39 There a different set of priorities, much less federally
oriented, governs.
40
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of pri-
ority under Revised Statute 3466 in Thelusson v. Smith, 4 1 in 1817. In
that case a creditor had obtained a judgment against the debtor prior to
the time when the debtor declared his insolvency. The debtor was also
in debt to the United States. The Court, by applying the statute, deter-
mined that the right of preference in favor of the United States accrued
on the date that the debtor declared his insolvency. At that point debts
owed to the United States were to be first satisfied, since the statute
made no exception for prior judgment creditors or any other type of
creditor.42 However, the Court did note that the United States could
only be satisfied out of the debtor's estate. This gave rise to certain
exceptions in later cases where, prior to the accrual of the right of pref-
erence, the debtor had made a bona fide conveyance of his property to
a third person, had mortgaged the real estate, or had had his property
seized on a writ of execution. In such cases, the debtor would be
divested of the property, and it would be immune from the priority of
the United States. 4
3
The Court in Thelusson did not consider whether a specific and
perfected lien, not reduced to possession, could defeat the priority of
the United States since the creditor's lien was not perfected. The an-
swer was by no means obvious. Though the holder of a perfected lien
36. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970). This statute is commonly referred to as Revised Statute 3466 in
both cases and law review articles, and will be referred to as such in this note. Though much
maligned, this statute remains binding authority. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77 (1975);
H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Haynsworth, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968).
37. Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515.
38. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976).
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107 (1976). See generally Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda
for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 240-43 (1967).
41. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
42. Id. at 425.
43. Id. at 426. Several decisions decided subsequent to Thelusson specifically extended the
exception to a previously executed mortgage on the theory that the mortgaged property had
passed to the mortgagee and was no longer in possession of the mortgagor. See Brent v. Bank of
Washington, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596 (1836); Conrad v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828).
432
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did not have possession, he did have a right to possession of specific
property. Thus in subsequent cases the Court was obliged to consider
whether liens on the property of an insolvent were perfected since, if
such a lien were found, it might defeat the priority of the United
States.44 It was through this search, and through the attempt to define
the requirements of a perfected lien, that the Court developed the
three-part test for choateness, namely, that the identity of the lienor
must be known, the property subject to the lien must be known, and the
amount payable must be fixed beyond any possibility of change.
45
In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,46 decided in 1946, the Court
for the first time enunciated its three-part test, though it had on several
prior occasions noted the various requirements individually.47 In that
case the state of Illinois was the holder of a statutory lien on the prop-
erty of an insolvent company for unpaid unemployment compensation.
Subsequently the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a claim for
unpaid federal income tax. The federal tax lien 48 alone was greater
than the liquidated. value of the debtor's property. After determining
that the debtor was indeed insolvent, the Court considered the issue of
priority. It recognized that previous decisions had never decided
whether the priority of the United States under Revised Statute 3466
could be overcome by a fully perfected lien. But once again the issue
escaped review, since the lien was not found to be perfected.4 9 Illinois'
lien failed on two counts. First, though the filing of a notice of lien was
recorded for a specific amount, the amount was not fixed beyond any
possibility of change since the state might have erred as to the amount
of taxes owed to it.s° Second, the state had no information concerning
the nature of the property belonging to the debtor company at the time
it went into receivership.51 Thus the state lien could not possibly have
attached to specific property prior to the accrual of the Commissioner's
right of preference under Revised Statute 3466. The Court, while
44. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Texas, 314
U.S. 480 (1941); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); County of Spokane v. United States,
279 U.S. 80 (1929).
45. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
46. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
47. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States
v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
48. A federal tax lien has been defined as a secret lien arising at the time the tax is assessed.
Overman, Federal Tax Liens: A Guide to the Priority System ofSection 6323 ofthe Internal Revenue
Code, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 729, 729 (1975). By secret lien it is meant that no notice of
the lien is recorded. Thus another creditor could not be aware that such an encumbrance on a
person's assets existed until it was recorded.
49. 329 U.S. at 376.
50. Id. at 375.
51. Id.
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bringing together in one opinion the three parts of the choate lien doc-
trine for the first time, recognized that it was "long established,"
52
under earlier cases enunciating individual parts of the doctrine.
Revised Statute 3466 has been criticized in recent years, chiefly
because it is overprotective of the interests of the United States. In
1969, the American Bar Association's Committee on Relative Priority
of Government and Private Liens recommended that the federal prior-
ity be limited to tax claims. In arguing for an amendment to the statute
the Committee stated:
In the beginning years of our nation, when this statute was enacted,
the activities in which the federal government engaged which could
give rise to claims against third parties were relatively restricted. To-
day, there are few areas of activity in which the federal government
is not involved. While the needs of the federal government for tax
revenues arguably require priority for the government to function
effectively, no such priority is imperative when the government has a
nontax claim against an insolvent. Rather, fairness to other creditors
seems to require that if the government undertakes activities in the
private sector, its claims in connection with such activities be treated
the same as those of any other creditor operating in the private sec-
tor. If the result is a loss of revenue to the government, the burden
should be met by tax revenues rather than being imposed arbitrarily
on hapless creditors of an insolvent.5
3
Yet the statute has not been amended since 1799,54 and it remains bind-
ing law.55
The Choate Lien Doctrine-Its Initial Application
in Non-Insolvency Proceedings
In United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,56 decided in
1950, the Supreme Court, for the first time, applied the test for choate-
ness to a competing lien in a non-insolvency tax proceeding. Prior to
that time, lower courts generally assumed that the principles governing
Revised Statute 3466 and section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code,5 7
the statute giving rise to liens for unpaid federal income taxes, 58 were
52. Id.
53. American Bar Association, Committee on Relative Priority of Government and Private
Liens, Proposed Legislation and Recent Developments on Lien Priorities, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TRUST J. 413, 414 (1969).
54. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676.
55. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77 (1975) (United States given priority over the
assets of an insolvent company which had defaulted on a government contract).
56. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (current version at 1.R.C. § 6321).
58. Code section 3670 created a lien for unpaid taxes. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53
Stat. 448 (current version at I.R.C. § 6321). The current version which is the same in significant
part as Code section 3670 provides:
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distinct and independent of each other. 59 It was reasoned that while
Revised Statute 3466 created a priority, Code section 3670 merely cre-
ated a lien. As a lien it was subject to the unmodified "first in time is
the first in right" 60 rule because the correlative choate lien doctrine had
never been applied in such a situation. If an inchoate non-federal lien
existed prior to an assessment for unpaid taxes by the Internal Revenue
Service, 6' the federal tax lien would take second. The holding in Secur-
ity Trust changed this result. By applying the choateness test to non-
federal liens, it gave federal tax liens in non-insolvency cases the same
practically insurmountable advantage enjoyed by the United States
under Revised Statute 3466.
In Security Trust, the issue was the priority between a federal tax
lien and an attachment lien "where the federal tax lien was recorded
subsequent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the
attaching creditor obtained judgment. '62 The case began when Morri-
son, seeking to enforce payment on an unsecured note, brought suit
against the owners of several parcels of land. In accordance with Cali-
fornia law, he attached the parcels of land. After the attachment but
before Morrison obtained judgment, the IRS filed a notice of federal
tax liens. The trial court ruled that Morrison's judgment lien was enti-
tled to priority. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed on
the basis of what it presumed to be the prevailing rule:
The liens created by Sections 3670 and 3671 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code are general and not priority liens. . . .There is no provi-
sion in either section indicating that the liens for taxes have a priority
over attachment liens placed on the property prior to the time when
the tax liens arise.63
The United States Supreme Court reversed,64 assuming that only a
perfected lien could defeat a federal tax lien. It found that even under
state law the federal lien would prevail since according to California
cases an attachment creditor could not proceed against the property of
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty,
together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belong-
ing to such person.
I.R.C. § 6321.
59. See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Okla. 1936); Cape
Fear Rys., Inc. v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1934), afdper curiam, 294 U.S. 693
(1935).
60. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
61. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS.
62. 340 U.S. at 48.
63. Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 613, 209 P.2d 657, 660 (1949) (citation omit-
ted).
64. United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
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a debtor until he obtained a judgment.65 This left Morrison with
"merely a lispendens notice that a right to a perfect lien exists."'66 The
brief rationale at the end of the opinion stated why, for the first time,
the Court was applying the stringent priority rules under Revised Stat-
ute 3466 to a non-insolvency proceeding. The Court stated:
In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority under
Rev. Stat. § 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat the fed-
eral priority merely to show a lien effective to protect the lienor
against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking sub-
sequent steps for enforcing it . . . . If the purpose of the federal tax
lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the
United States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule
must prevail here.
67
The reasoning of the Court is curious for two reasons. First, because it
overlooks several statutory considerations, it is wholly inadequate,
given the precedential effect of the decision. The Court failed to note
that Revised Statute 3466 clearly establishes a priority while Code sec-
tion 3670 merely establishes a lien and is absolutely devoid of any men-
tion of priority.68 There is no mention of Code section 367269 which
codifies the priority of federal tax liens. The Court also failed to recog-
nize the different purposes behind the statutes. Revised Statute 3466
applies to any debt owed to the United States, but only where the
debtor is insolvent, while Code section 3670 applies only to tax debts,
though the debtor may be solvent or insolvent. 70 Second, the Court's
only reasoning for the extension, that it is necessary "to insure prompt
and certain collection of taxes due to the United States from tax delin-
quents," 71 seems questionable. Since the debtor is solvent, his assets
presumably are greater than his debts. Add to this the fact that a fed-
eral tax lien is a general lien which can be satisfied from all the debtor's
assets,72 and there seems to be no reason to extend the priority. The
federal tax lien will most likely be satisfied whether it is paid first or
last.
73
65. See Puissegur v. Yarbrough, 29 Cal. 2d 409, 175 P.2d 830 (1946).
66. 340 U.S. at 50.
67. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (current version
at I.R.C. § 6321).
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672, 53 Stat. 449 (current version at I.R.C. § 6323).
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (current version
at I.R.C. § 6321).
71. 340 U.S. at 51.
72. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (current version at I.R.C. § 6321).
73. The occasion may arise where the outstanding debts of a solvent debtor are not entirely
satisfied. If the debtor does not have liquid assets available to pay his debts, a creditor's only
remedy may be a forced sale of the debtor's property. Though the fair market value of the prop-
erty is enough to satisfy all the debts, the proceeds realized from a forced sale are often less than
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Though the reasoning for extending the doctrine to non-insol-
vency cases seems suspect, at least in terms of federal tax liens, the
Supreme Court has continued to apply the extension.74 However, deci-
sions since Security Trust leave some doubt as to whether the choate-
ness test applies with the same degree of rigor where the debtor is
solvent.
In United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.75 the Court gave a
stringent interpretation to the choate lien doctrine. It was reminiscent
of the Court's rigid application of the doctrine in Illinois ex rel Gordon
v. Campbell76 and United States v. Texas.77 The case arose out of a
contest between a federal tax lien and a mechanic's lien. The mechan-
ic's lienor had completed his work, recorded his lien for a specific
amount, and instituted a suit to enforce his lien-all prior to the assess-
ment of federal income taxes. He had done everything but reduce his
lien to judgment. This was accomplished by the time the IRS had filed
an action to foreclose its tax lien. Nonetheless, the Court found the
federal tax lien to be prior in time.78 The Court held, in effect, that in
order for the mechanic's lienor to have prevailed, he would have had to
reduce his lien to judgment before the federal taxes were assessed. 79 A
similar burden for establishing choateness was placed on the non-fed-
eral lienor in United States v. Texas,80 an insolvency case. 81 Thus it
seems that the Court applied the same rigorous standard found in in-
the fair market value. Thus a creditor such as the federal government cannot be assured of full
payment in every case. However, even granting this exception, the court's rationale for extending
the priority rules under Revised Statute 3466 is still unsound. Where the debtor is insolvent at
least one debt will always remain unsatisfied. Where the debtor is solvent a debt will remain
unsatisfied only in exceptional cases.
74. See United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 384 U.S. 323
(1966); United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964); United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374
U.S. 84 (1963); United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (per curiam); United States v. White
Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam); United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808
(1955) (per curiam); United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955);
United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81
(1954).
75. 350 U.S. 1010 (1956). The decision was entered per curiam and the facts were stated by
Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent.
76. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
77. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
78. 350 U.S. at 1010.
79. If one accepts the premise that the choate lien doctrine applies with equal force where the
debtor is solvent, the result is logical. In United States v. Texas the Court found the lien inchoate
because, inter alia, the amount of the lien had not been ascertained beyond any possibility of
change. The amount of taxes had been assessed precisely, but because the taxpayer could rebut
the presumption' that the taxes were computed correctly, there existed a possibility of change. In
White Bear, though the lien was for a specific amount, presumably a court could find, with the
proper evidence, that the amount of the lien was incorrect. Only a judgment could eliminate all
possibility of change.
80. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
81. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
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solvency cases to this case involving a solvent debtor. White Bear rep-
resents the Court's most stringent application of the doctrine.
Other decisions have exhibited a more relaxed application. United
States v. City of New Britain82 involved a contest between federal tax
liens and several municipal liens for the funds of a solvent corporation.
There were also two mortgage liens, a judgment of record, and ex-
penses of a judgment sale foreclosing the two mortgages. The United
States did not assert its priority against these latter claims. The
Supreme Court found that both the municipal and federal liens were
perfected-the city's because it attached to specific pieces of property,
83
and the federal government's because it was general and perfected
upon assessment. 84 The Court, given the facts before it and the finding
that all liens were perfected, did not determine the order of priority
among the competing liens. The case was remanded to the lower court
for a determination of the priorities.
85
The language used by the Court in describing the nature of a per-
fected non-federal lien indicates a more relaxed attitude than compara-
ble descriptions found in cases applying Revised Statute 3466. In
referring to the city's lien the Court stated that "[tlhe liens may also be
perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a
choate lien-when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien, and the amount of the lien are established. ' 86 This language is
less exacting than that found in insolvency cases where the courts, in
referring to the amount of the lien, consistently required that it be fixed
beyond any possibility of change. 87 It is not surprising that Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in United States v. White Bear Brewing Co. ,88 cited
New Britain's language in arguing that the White Bear Court had de-
parted from its prior decisions.
89
82. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1853 (1949) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
172 (West 1972)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 758 (1949) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-239 (West 1972)).
84. 347 U.S. at 84. Code section 3671 determined the point at which the federal lien arose.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3671, 53 Stat. 449 (current version at 1.R.C. § 6322). The current
version, which is the same in significant part as Code section 367 I, provides that:
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 shall
arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the
amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
I.R.C. § 6322.
85. 347 U.S. at 88.
86. Id. at 84.
87. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1945); United
States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 488 (1941).
88. 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 1010-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Another indication of the Court's more relaxed attitude was its re-
liance on the state court for its finding that the city's lien attached to
specific pieces of property.90 Prior cases had relied upon the opinions
of state courts to the detriment of the non-federal lienor. 91 In United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank92 the Court had stated that
"although a state court's classification of a lien as specific and perfected
is entitled to weight, it is subject to reexamination by this Court. On
the other hand, if the state court itself describes the lien as inchoate,
this classification is 'practically conclusive.' ,,93 In all prior cases the
Court had rejected upon reexamination 94 the state court's classification,
except where the lien was described as inchoate.95 Where the lien was
described as inchoate, the state court's classification was conclusive. In
New Britain the Court broke with its one-sided trend and upheld the
state court's classification although the lien was held by the state court
to be choate.96
In the 1964 case, United States v. Vermont, 97 the Court, for the first
and only time, found a non-federal lien prior in right where the result
was governed by the choate lien doctrine. The case involved a contest
between a federal lien arising under sections 6321 and 6322 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 98 and a Vermont tax lien statute "worded in
terms virtually identical to the provisions of those federal statutes." 99
The delinquent taxpayer was a solvent Vermont corporation. Vermont
made its tax assessment in 1958, and in 1959 a judgment was entered
for taxes owed. The IRS made its assessment in 1959, prior to the judg-
ment in favor of the state, and brought suit to foreclose its lien in 1961.
The state argued that its lien, like that of the United States, was general
in that it attached to all the property of the delinquent taxpayer. Thus
the requirement that a lien must attach to specifically identified prop-
90. 347 U.S. at 84.
91. See, e.g., County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93-95 (1929).
92. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
93. d. at 49-50.
94. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1947); United States v. Waddill,
Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); United
States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923).
95. See United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); County of Spokane
v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
96. 347 U.S. at 84. For purposes of priority, a federal tax lien arises at the time of assessment
(at the time the taxpayer is found to be liable to the Internal Revenue Service). See note 84 supra.
Thus for the municipal lien to have prevailed in New Britain, the municipal lien would have had
to become choate before the Internal Revenue Service processed the taxpayer's tax return. There
are statutory exceptions to this rigorous standard. See text accompanying notes 159-72 infra.
97. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
98. I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6322.
99. 377 U.S. at 352. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5765 (1958) (current version at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 5895(a) (1970)).
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erty was inapplicable, and the fact that Vermont's lien was a general
lien was not an obstacle to choateness. The United States argued that a
competing state lien had to attach to specific portions of property,
much as did the municipal liens in New Britain. It urged the Court to
apply the federal priority created by Revised Statute 3466 to this non-
insolvency case, arguing that the Court had already done so in United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank.10 0°
The Court rejected these arguments, and held that Vermont's lien
was "sufficiently choate to obtain priority over the later federal
lien. . . ." "0' The Court reasoned that "it is as true of Vermont's lien
here as it was of the federal lien in New Britain that 'The assessment is
given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid
when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's property to
satisfy the debt.' ",102
Though the holding in Vermont is sound, some of the reasoning is
questionable. The Court, in rejecting the argument that the priority
under Revised Statute 3466 applies to cases where the debtor is solvent,
stated, "This argument fails to discriminate between the standards ap-
plicable under the federal tax lien provisions and those applicable to an
insolvent debtor under R.S. § 3466."103 The Court indicated that under
Revised Statute 3466 a non-federal lien was perfected only if the prop-
erty to which the lien attached was reduced to possession.' °4 On the
other hand, where the debtor was solvent, the three-part test for choate-
ness was the proper standard. 0 5 To support its conclusion, the Court
referred to United States v. Gilbert Associates,0 6 an insolvency case de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1953. The Vermont Court noted that
Gilbert had applied the possession test for determining whether a lien
was perfected. 0 7 Further, Gilbert had failed to mention specifically the
three-part test for choateness. 0 8 From this the Vermont Court inferred
that only liens reduced to possession could defeat the federal priority in
insolvency proceedings, and that the three-part test was only proper in
non-insolvency proceedings. 0 9
These conclusions are not supported by prior case law. First, the
100. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
101. 377 U.S. at 359.
102. Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
103. Id. at 357.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 358.
106. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
107. 377 U.S. at 357.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 357-58.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Court's reliance on Gilbert is misplaced. Though the Gilbert Court did
not specifically mention the three-part test, it did consider the possibil-
ity that a perfected lien not reduced to possession might defeat the fed-
eral priority." 0 The Court stated, "This Court has never actually held
that there is such an exception. Once again, we find it unnecessary to
meet this issue because the lien asserted here does not raise the ques-
tion.""' This statement not only indicates such a possibility but it
also indicates that some test, presumably the three-part test used in
prior cases, was used to determine that the non-federal lien was not
perfected.
Second, the Vermont Court ignored the fact that the three-part test
was first applied in Illinois ex re/. Gordon v. Campbell, " 2 an insolvency
case. It also ignored the fact that the three-part test had been applied,
in part, in a number of earlier cases." 3 In those cases, the Court care-
fully analyzed the nature of the non-federal lien in order to be sure that
the lien was not perfected. If the only inquiry in an insolvency case
was whether a lien was reduced to possession before the debtor de-
clared his insolvency, a priority contest under Revised Statute 3466
would be decided quite simply. This was not the case in the more re-
cent Supreme Court insolvency cases." 4 If it had been the case, a care-
ful analysis of the non-federal lien would have been unnecessary.
After Vermont, the relative stringency of the federal rule in insol-
vency and non-insolvency proceedings remains confusing. If Vermont
is taken at face value the difference between the two is clear. Where
the debtor is insolvent, the test is based on possession. This reverts to
the test in Thelusson v. Smith." 5 On the other hand, where the debtor
is solvent, the test is based on choateness. But Vermont cannot be rec-
onciled with earlier cases. Illinois ex rel Gordon v. Campbell" 6 is in-
consistent with Vermont because Gordon requires that choateness be a
basis for determining lien perfection in insolvency cases.' 1 United
States v. White Bear Brewing Co. 118 and United States v. Security Trust
& Savings Bank' '9 indicate that the choateness test should be applied
I0. 345 U.S. at 365.
111. Id.
112. 329 U.S. 362 (1946). See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
113. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States
v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
114. See, e.g., Illinois ex tel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v.
Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
115. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
116. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
117. Id. at 375.
118. 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam).
119. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
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most stringently in both instances. 20 The application of the test in
United States v. City of New Britain'2 1 is similar to that found in
Vermont, but New Britain does not go so far as to hold that possession
is the only test under Revised Statute 3466.122 In spite of the confusion,
one conclusion in Vermont is clear: If choateness is the basis for mea-
suring perfection of liens in both instances, it should not be applied
with the same degree of rigor where the debtor is solvent. 1
23
Developments since 1964 have neither clarified nor expanded the
position of the Supreme Court. 124 The Court has never considered a
case where the priority of a federal lien other than a tax lien was at
issue. Finally, the importance of its decisions in the tax lien area has
been greatly reduced by the passage of the Tax Lien Act of 1966,125 an
Act which created a new, less protective set of priorities for federal tax
liens. 1
26
THE TAX LIEN ACT OF 1966-A TURNING POINT
The statutory priorities created by the Tax Lien Act of 1966127
supercede those priorities which otherwise would be established under
the federal common law rule-the rule that "first in time is first in
right"'128 and its corollary, the choate lien doctrine. However, the Act
has also proved to be important with regard to federal non-tax liens.
After 1966 courts began to reject the federal common law rule. 29 They
reasoned that if Congress considered the rule inappropriate in its appli-
cation to tax liens, it was likewise inappropriate in instances of non-tax
liens. 130 The provisions of the Act also provided guidance when courts
were faced with the problem of fashioning a new federal common law
rule. '31
120. See text accompanying notes 75-81 supra.
121. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
122. Id. at 85.
123. See Overman, Federal Tax Liens. A Guide to the Priority System of Section 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 729, 731-34 (1975).
124. The only Supreme Court case since 1964 in which the priority of a federal lien against the
assets of a solvent debtor was in issue was United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States, 384 U.S. 323 (1966). The decision added little to existing law.
125. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
126. See text accompanying notes 159-72 infra.
127. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
128. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
129. See text accompanying notes 184-226 infra.
130. See text accompanying notes 186-89, 199 & 213-19 infra.
131. See text accompanying notes 186-88 & 213-19 infra.
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Background of the Act-Growing Discontent
The first statute creating the federal tax lien was passed in 1866.132
It did not specify the priorities by which it was to be governed. Neither
did it provide for any procedure by which notice of the lien would be
recorded. Thus the federal tax lien acted as a secret lien upon the prop-
erty of the delinquent taxpayer. 133 Its presence as an encumbrance
upon property could not be detected. In United States v. Snyder,' 34 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the concept of the secret lien by
concluding that the federal tax lien was not subject to a state constitu-
tion's compulsory recordation provision. 135 The Court found that a
purchaser of property encumbered by a secret federal tax lien took the
property subject to the lien, although he was ignorant of its presence. 1
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Congress remedied this inequitable situation in 1913 when it
amended the statute which gave rise to the federal tax lien. 137 The
amendment provided that "such lien shall not be valid as against any
mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice of such lien
shall be filed by the collector in the office of the clerk of the district
court of the district within which the property subject to such lien is
situated .... ,,138 The statute further provided for recordation with the
recorder of deeds of the appropriate county if required by state law.
139
This amendment effectively reversed the holding in United States v.
Snyder.140 In 1939, the list of protected lienors was expanded to in-
clude pledgees. 14  One court, explaining the statute, stated that "after
the notice of lien has been filed such lien is enforceable against any
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor of the tax delin-
quent whose interest in the property and right to property belonging to
such tax delinquent arises, or is created, subsequent to the recording of
132. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107. The statute's wording was much like the
present statute, Code section 6321, but it applied to all taxes assessed by the United States:
[I1f any person, bank, association, com pany, or corporation, liable to pay any tax, shall
neglect or refuse to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the
United States from the time it was due until paid, with the interest, penalties, and costs
that may accrue in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to property belonging
to such person, bank, association, company, or corporation....
133. See note 48 supra.
134. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
135. Id. at 214.
136. Id.
137. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
141. Act of June 29, 1939, § 401, 53 Stat. 882 (current version at I.R.C. § 6323(a)). This
amendment was passed in response to the holding in United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Mich. 1938) (federal lien had priority over securities subsequently acquired by broker with-
out actual notice of the lien).
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the tax lien . . " 142 But the statute did not state, nor did that court
explain, at what point an interest arises, or whether the interest must be
perfected before the federal tax lien is recorded. The issue was ad-
dressed in 1963 by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Pioneer American Insurance Co. 143
In Pioneer a delinquent taxpayer had acquired an interest in a par-
cel of land and had assumed liability on a note and a mortgage secur-
ing it. The mortgage included an arrangement whereby the delinquent
taxpayer and mortgagor promised to pay reasonable attorney's fees to
the mortgagee, Pioneer, in case he defaulted on the mortgage. The tax-
payer defaulted and Pioneer filed suit to foreclose its mortgage, seeking
in addition, reasonable attorney's fees. Several federal tax liens also
attached to the parcel of land before the decree of foreclosure was en-
tered. The chancery court hearing the suit held that the tax liens were
junior to the mortgage lien including the attorney's fees. The state
court of review affirmed. 144 As a result, some of the federal tax liens
remained unsatisfied.
On appeal before the Supreme Court, the federal government did
not contest the priority of the mortgage, but it did argue that its liens
were superior to that part of the mortgage lien devoted to attorney's
fees. The Court agreed, and clarified the status of the liens protected
under Internal Revenue Code section 6323(a), the successor to Code
section 3672. The decision analyzed the legislative history behind the
original predecessor to Code section 6323(a) 145 and concluded that:
The section dealt with the federal lien only and it did not purport to
affect the time at which local liens were deemed to arise or to become
choate or to subordinate the tax lien to tentative, conditional or im-
perfected state liens. Rather, we believe Congress intended that if
out of the whole spectrum of state-created liens, certain liens are to
enjoy the preferred status granted by § 6323, they should at least
have attained the degree of perfection required of other liens and be
choate for the purposes of the federal rule.146
The Court held that since the decree of the chancery court fixing the
amount of reasonable attorney's fees was not entered until after the
filing of the federal tax lien, the lien for attorney's fees was perfected
subsequent to the recording of the tax lien and was junior to the tax
lien. 4
7
142. United States v. Phillips, 198 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1952). See also Grand Prairie State
Bank v. United States, 206 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1953).
143. 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
144. 235 Ark. 267, 357 S.W.2d 653 (1962).
145. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912).
146. 374 U.S. at 89.
147. Id. at 91.
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In light of this decision it is clear that Code section 6323(a) gave
very little additional protection to the liens enumerated in it. Prior to
1913, to be assured of priority, liens listed had to be perfected before
the tax deficiencies were assessed. 48 After 1913, they had to be per-
fected before the deficiencies were recorded. 149 If the IRS recorded its
liens as they arose, the enumerated local liens were given no extra time
in which to become perfected. Even the stated purpose of the notice
requirement-to give notice to the specified interest holders of federal
tax liens attaching to the property in which the local lienors have an
interest or intend to purchase or otherwise obtain an interest' 0-is
sometimes circumvented. If one of these lienholders has an un-
perfected lien on real property before the recordation of a federal tax
lien on that property, the notice requirement affords no protection.
This was the case in United States v. Pioneer American Insurance Co. 151
Prior to 1966, Congress was soundly rebuked by many commenta-
tors for its inaction in the tax lien area. 52 These writers were alarmed
by the extension of federal priorities at the expense of private creditors
in a number of United States Supreme Court decisions. As early as
1959, the Special Committee on Federal Liens of the American Bar
Association recommended a comprehensive revision of the law regard-
ing federal tax liens, priorities and procedures. 153 The Committee de-
clared, "This extension of the scope of the federal tax lien and the
uncertainties the decisions have created have had a severe impact on
innumerable business and commercial transactions, and have caused
increasing concern on the part of many lawyers throughout the coun-
try." 154
The Tax Lien Act of 1966: New Status
for Mechanic's Lienors
The passage of the Tax Lien Act of 1966155 was greeted with warm
148. See United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
149. See Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 (current version at I.R.C. § 6323 (a)).
150. H.R. REP. No. 1802, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
151. 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
152. Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign ofthe Federal Gopernment
Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IOWA L. REV. 724 (1965); McNally, Federal Lien Priority. An Injus-
tice to Creditors, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 52 (1962); Mitchell, The Choateness Doctrine-Both Uncon-
scionable and Unconstitutional, 38 CONN. B.J. 252 (1964); Note, Federal Priorities and Tax Liens,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1963).
153. Special Committee on Federal Liens, Report, 84 A.B.A. REP. 645 (1959).
154. Plumb, What Ever Happened to the A.B.A. Federal Tax Lien Legislation?, 18 Bus. LAW
1103, 1103 (1963).
155. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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approval.156 The Act totally revised the system of priorities where one
of the competing liens was a federal tax lien. One of its major objec-
tives was to reform the choate lien doctrine and eliminate or minimize
the inequities and impediments to business transactions which it cre-
ated. 57 One commentator, in referring to the passage of the act stated:
"Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by this sun ..
Shakespeare, I am sure, was not thinking of federal tax lien reform,
but his words serve as a suitable text for this discussion. For we have
known 16 winters of growing discontent since the Supreme Court
began the parade of decisions which expanded the priority of federal
tax liens and eroded the protections on which the business and bank-
ing community rely for their security. The American Bar Associa-
tion worked for many of those years to bring about an
accommodation between the legitimate necessities of revenue collec-
tion and the practicalities of modern credit transactions. Now at last
those efforts have borne fruit in the enactment of the first compre-
hensive revision of the law of federal tax liens in over half a century.
Truly, the summer sun is shining!
158
The Tax Lien Act 15 9 included provisions improving the position of
many previously unprotected or less protected interests. First, it cre-
ated a category of interests given so-called "superpriority" status.'
60
These interests were given priority even though they might arise subse-
quent to the filing of the tax lien.' 6 1 Second, the Act protected dis-
156. See Creedon, The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966-An Historic Breakthrough, 4 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 161 (1967); Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW 271 (1967); Young,
Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1967); Note, Choateness and the 1966
Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN. L. REV. 198 (1967).
157. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 41 (1966). See also Note, Choateness and the
1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN. L. REV. 198 (1967).
158. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 271 (1967).
159. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
160. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125-27.
161. One reason for giving superpriority status to certain liens was to remedy the problem of
circular priority. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE
L.J. 228, 231-32 (1967). Such a circular priority problem arose in United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). The Court had before it the following competing liens: a federal tax
lien, a municipal lien arising out of property taxes, and a judgment lien. According to section
6323 of the Internal Revenue Code as in force at that time, the federal tax lien was superior to
municipal liens, but inferior to judgment liens. According to state law the municipal liens were
superior to all other liens. The following circuitous situation resulted: Under federal law the fed-
eral tax lien could not be paid until the judgment lien had been paid, and the municipal lien could
not be paid until the federal tax lien had been paid. But under state law, which governed the
relationship between the municipal lien and the judgment lien since no federal question existed,
the judgment lien could not be paid until the municipal lien was paid. Each interest's payment
was contingent upon the prior payment of another interest. The inevitable loser in such a situa-
tion was the judgment lienor, whose interest, ironically, was the most protected under federal law.
The Tax Lien Act remedied this situation by giving superpriority status to real property tax
and special assessment liens. See I.R.C. § 6323(b)(6). See also McCormick, Superpriorities: An
Analysis of Five Instances of Federal Tax Lien Subordination, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 571 (1976).
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bursements of funds made under certain types of financing agreements
which created a security interest in the taxpayer's property even though
the disbursements might be made after the notice of the tax lien was
filed.' 62 To be protected under this provision the financing agreement
itself had to be entered into before the notice was filed. Third, the Act
gave limited protection to other security interests which came into be-
ing as a result of disbursements made after the filing. 163 Again the
agreement had to be entered into before the date of filing, but these
interests were protected only when the disbursements were made
within forty-five days of the date of filing or before actual notice of
filing, whichever occurred sooner. Fourth, the Act significantly
amended the provisions found in the earlier version of Code section
6323(a). 164 It replaced the terms "mortgagee" and "pledgee" with the
all-inclusive term "security interests," thereby embracing all forms of
commercial security.165 It defined the term "purchaser" to include op-
tionees, lessees, and parties to executory contracts for the purchase of
property. 66 But the most dramatic change was the inclusion of
mechanic's lienors within this protected category.
Prior to 1966, mechanic's lienors were afforded no statutory pro-
tection. Thus they were subject to the full force of the choate lien doc-
trine. 167 This produced especially inequitable results since the person
who improved the taxpayer's property, in reliance on a lien perfected
under local law, lost the benefit of his labor or materials to the federal
government because of a secret federal tax lien. The Act changed this
result by requiring that a mechanic's lienor must have notice of the tax
lien. 168 Thus the mechanic's lienor was protected to the same extent as
the other secured creditors enumerated in Code section 6323(a). But
the Act went further. It defined mechanic's lienors so as to protect
them even after notice-filing was accomplished. 169 The Senate Finance
Committee Report described the mechanic's lienor and the nature of
his priority as follows:
162. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1127-28.
163. Id
164. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125.
165. Id. Compare the definition of security interest found in the Uniform Commercial Code,
U.C.C. § 1-201(37), with that found in Code section 6323(h)(I).
166. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125, 1131. However, some
courts have indicated that judgment creditors, purchasers, and holders of security interests must
perfect their interests before notice of the federal tax lien is given. See Dugan v. Missouri Neon &
Plastic Advertising Co., 472 F.2d 944, 950-51 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264
(8th Cir. 1972).
167. See, e.g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
168. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125.
169. Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1130.
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Under the bill a "mechanic's lienor" is a person who, under local
law, has a lien on real property (or on the proceeds of a contract
relating to real property) for furnishing services, labor, or materials
in connection with the construction or improvement of the property.
A mechanic is considered to have this lien under the bill as of the
time the mechanic begins to furnish services, labor or materials, or, if
later, the time when his lien is effective under local law. This pro-
tects mechanics under most State laws, where the mechanic's lien
arises as of the time when the mechanic commences his labor or be-
gins supplying materials, even though he does not perfect his lien
(such as by filing or by securing a judgment) until long after this
time. 170
According to the Act, as long as the mechanic's lienor begins to furnish
services, labor, or materials before the filing of the competing tax lien,
and the lien is perfected at some point in the future (not necessarily
before the filing), the mechanic's lien is entitled to priority, unless state
law provides a later point in time when the lien becomes effective.' 7 '
The subsequent perfection of the mechanic's lien is said to relate back
to the time when services were initially provided. 172 This, in effect, ne-
gates all influence of the choate lien doctrine on mechanic's lienors.
They are, practically speaking, given superpriority status since, in most
states, their liens can only be defeated if the federal tax lien is filed
before they begin work.
The Tax Lien Act silenced most of the criticism surrounding the
priority of federal tax liens. In general commentators were pleased
with the changes it made. 173 Those liens not specifically addressed by
the Act were still subject to the federal common law rule. However,
this was not considered unfair because the holders of those liens gener-
ally had not advanced credit in reliance on the property subject to the
tax lien.' 74 One commentator summarized his response to the Act:
Nobody-not even the Treasury--got everything he wanted in the
new legislation. Some no doubt would have preferred a sweeping
rule that state law shall govern in all respects the priorities of federal
taxes. Others surely wish that the law might have granted relief in
specific situations which it failed to cover, or which it covered in less
favorable ways. But legislation, like all matters political, is the art of
the possible, and the accommodation of conflicting views and inter-
ests is its essence. The law which has finally emerged after years of
study and negotiation is, if imperfect, "pretty good" from everyone's
170. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3722, 3734.
171. In most states a mechanic's lien arises on or before the date on which he commences
work. See generally text accompanying notes 278-95 infra.
172. Note, Choaleness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN. L. REV. 198, 212 (1967).
173. See text accompanying notes 155-58 supra.
174. Note, Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN L. REV. 198, 221 (1967).
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standpoint. In fact, in my opinion, it is a very good law. 175
THE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW RULE
TO NON-TAX CASES
Following the codification of priorities in the tax lien area, there
still remained "the unfinished business, the problem areas .... ",176
The priority of federal non-tax liens was and is still one of those areas.
Since the system of priorities for federal non-tax liens is virtually un-
codified, the federal common law rule-i e., "the first in time is the first
in right,"177 and its corollary, the choate lien doctrine-governs in most
cases. A non-federal lien must meet the three-part test for choateness
at the time the federal lien arises or it is junior to the federal lien.
78
Most lower federal courts have found the federal common law rule
applicable in determining whether the federal government has priority
in collecting on its non-tax liens. 79 Prior to 1966, the courts supported
this conclusion by citing United States Supreme Court cases which had
applied the rule for the benefit of federal tax liens.' 80 They assumed
that the rule was equally valid in cases involving federal non-tax liens.
After the passage of the Tax Lien Act,' 8 ' courts could no longer be
certain. Since Congress had seen fit to rewrite the law of priorities re-
garding federal tax liens, perhaps the reasoning behind the changes was
relevant to the priority of non-tax liens. Courts have recognized the
necessity for change, yet most of them have refused to act, reasoning
175. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 271, 295 (1967).
176. Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agendafor the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 228
(1967).
177. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
178. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
179. See note 12 supra.
180. In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. County of
Iowa, 295 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Roessling, 280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960);
Southwest Engine Co. v. United States, 275 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Ringwood
Iron Mines, 251 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Latrobe Const. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 890 (1957).
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Roessling, 280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960), contended that
the Supreme Court applied the rule governing the priority of federal tax liens to federal mortgage
liens in City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928). However the statement
results from a misreading of the New Brunswick case. There, federally owned land was sold to
private purchasers who executed a mortgage to secure the unpaid purchase price. Subsequently
the city attempted to collect taxes through sale of the land. The Court held that the city could not
institute tax sales on land where the federal government either retained legal title or reserved a
lien. The Court did not base its decision on the priority of the federal mortgage lien, but upon the
proposition that state and local governments cannot tax the property interests of the United States
without the consent of Congress. 280 F.2d at 936. See United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S. 174 (1944).
181. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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that any change in the law should be initiated by Congress. 82 A few
courts have rejected the rule either in part or in whole. 8 3 Inequities
persist, yet the rule as it relates to non-tax liens, remains binding au-
thority in most jurisdictions.
Opposition to the Federal Common Law Rule-A Strong Minority
The Ault Opinion
In Ault v. Harris,84 the United States District Court for Alaska
rejected the federal common law rule. It determined that a mechanic's
lien was entitled to priority over a mortgage lien held by the Small
Business Administration. 185 The SBA lien was executed prior to the
performance of services by the mechanic's lienor but was not recorded
until after the mechanic's lienor commenced work. Unquestionably
the SBA lien would have prevailed under the federal common law rule.
After finding no evidence of insolvency, the court considered the
applicability of the federal common law rule. The United States ar-
gued that the rule was necessary to protect the public treasury. The
court responded that the SBA should disburse its funds with greater
vigilance or withhold sufficient funds from its loan to pay a lien if one
is established. The court then noted that if this case had been decided
under the Tax Lien Act'8 6 the mechanic's lien would have prevailed. It
found no reason to adopt a more stringent rule for the SBA. The court
further noted that the Tax Lien Act intended that local law be applied
to the situation before it. Accordingly it adopted local law 187 as its fed-
eral rule. Since under local law, the mechanic's lien was entitled to
priority over other types of liens which were unrecorded at the time the
mechanic's lienor began supplying labor or materials, 188 the mechanic's
lien prevailed.
The court relied heavily on the passage of the Tax Lien Act. It
182. Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1972); T.H.
Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977); Hayden v. Prevatte,
327 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1971); Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), aj7'dsub fno.
Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
184. 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), ar/'dsub nom. Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th
Cir. 1970).
185. Hereinafter abbreviated as SBA.
186. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
187. ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.060 (1977).
188. 317 F. Supp. at 376. The reasoning of the court in Ault was cited with approval in United
States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1975), but the holding, that an
SBA lien was inferior to a local tax lien, rested on a federal statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 646 (1976).
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reasoned that if a mechanic's lien prevails over a tax lien, it should, a
fortiori, prevail over an SBA mortgage lien. This argument has some
merit. Certainly the act of raising revenue by income tax is fundamen-
tal to the welfare of our country. A large percentage of our revenue is
raised in this manner. 89 In addition, the IRS, as involuntary creditor,
is not able to pick and choose its debtors. The SBA, on the other hand,
may choose its debtors. However, the court, by encouraging greater
vigilance, may be asking the SBA to act contrary to its mandate. The
declared policy of the SBA requires it to lend money to small busi-
nesses which are likely to be rejected by private lending institutions. 90
Though greater vigilance may be possible, SBA loans necessarily in-
clude a high risk factor. The court's alternative-that the SBA with-
hold sufficient funds to pay a lien if one is established-seems more
plausible and far less detrimental to the goal of helping business con-
cerns in high risk situations.' 91
The Kimbell Opinion
In Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank, 192 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a result similar to
that in Ault. Once again the SBA was involved, but this time it was a
guarantor of a private loan for $300,000 made by Republic National
Bank to O.K. Supermarkets, Inc. Under an agreement entered into in
1969, the SBA guaranteed ninety percent of the loan. The loan was
secured by O.K.'s "machinery, fixtures, equipment, inventory and all
additions and accessions thereto,' 93 and the security agreement was
duly filed. However, in 1966, O.K. had executed the first of several
loan security agreements to Kimbell Foods, Inc. These loans also were
secured by items such as O.K.'s machinery, fixtures and equipment.
The loans were paid off with part of the funds received from Republic,
but new debts were constantly accruing because O.K. was buying from
Kimbell on open account. O.K. defaulted on its note to Republic and
the SBA paid Republic ninety percent of the outstanding indebtedness,
more than $252,000. On January 21, 1971, Republic, in turn, assigned
ninety percent of its interest in the debt to the SBA. Meanwhile, on
January 15, 1971, Kimbell filed suit to recover on its debt, and on Janu-
189. According to the United States Treasury Department, Office of Management and Budget,
receipts from individual and corporate income taxes totaled approximately sixty percent of all
receipts for fiscal year 1977. [19781 THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 75.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
191. This practice also is carried on to some extent by the Federal Housing Authority. See
text accompanying notes 276-77 infra.
192. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977).
193. Id. at 493-94.
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ary 31, 1972, obtained a judgment for $24,000. Thus both Kimbell and
the SBA were competing for their share of approximately $86,000,
which represented the proceeds from the sale of O.K.'s equipment and
other assets.
The district court, 94 following the choate lien doctrine, ruled that
the lien of the SBA had priority because Kimbell had not reduced its
claim to judgment before the SBA either guaranteed Republic's note or
made good on its guarantee. 95 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed. It initially determined that the security agreements
between Kimbell and O.K. covered O.K.'s subsequent purchases on
open account, and that Kimbell's lien would be entitled to priority
under state law. However, the United States argued that its priority
should be determined by the choate lien doctrine. The court gave four
policy reasons for rejecting the choate lien doctrine on the facts before
it. First, the court noted that the reasons for extending the priority
under Revised Statute 3466 to tax liens are not present where the SBA
is a quasi-commercial lender. 96 The United States as the holder of a
tax lien is an involuntary creditor and is often not aware of its status
until after other creditors have made their claims on the debtor's prop-
erty. The SBA on the other hand, as a voluntary creditor, can examine
the interests of other creditors and can require whatever security it feels
is necessary. Second, the court stated that the collection of taxes is cen-
tral to the functioning of government. 97 The SBA as a supplement to
commercial loan operations is less central to governmental functioning.
Third, the court said that allowing the SBA priority in the collection of
its debt would discourage potential creditors of small businesses. 198 Po-
tential creditors would fear that the collateral for their loans would be
used as security for a future SBA loan. Finally, the court stated that
the Tax Lien Act greatly restricted the priority of federal tax liens.' 99
An SBA lien, which is less worthy of protection than a federal tax lien,
should not be the beneficiary of an expanded priority.
The United States next argued that other federal courts had ap-
plied the federal common law rule where the federal priority was at
stake. The court responded by noting that all other non-tax lien cases
decided by the federal courts, with the exception of those decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, were "not
194. 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
195. Id. at 328.
196. 557 F.2d at 500.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 501.
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necessarily authority for adoption of the choateness doctrine. . . for in
each case the application of the 'first in time, first in right' doctrine,
without using the concept of choateness, could have given priority to the
federal liens because each competing state lien arose after the federal
lien." 2°° The court acknowledged that the Third Circuit had applied
the choate lien doctrine per se,201 but the Fifth Circuit held the doctrine
to be inappropriate on the Kimbell facts.
With the choate lien doctrine cast aside, the court had to formulate
a new standard for the perfection of Kimbell's lien. This was necessary
because Kimbell's lien could only compete under the "first in time is
the first in right" 20 2 priority rule if it was held to be perfected, regard-
less of the standard applied. The court solved its dilemma in the fol-
lowing manner:
[I]n the context of competing state security interests arising under the
U.C.C., we conclude that liens perfected under the UCC [sic] qualify
to compete against federal liens under the federal "first in time, first
in right" priority rules. The UCC carefully prescribed the steps nec-
essary to perfect a security interest. Perfection under the UCC pro-
vides many of the assurances of the existence of a lien required by
the choateness doctrine-identity of the debtor, identity of the
lienholder, and identity of the property serving as collateral. Fur-
ther, the UCC embodies rules of nationwide applicability-all states
but Louisiana have adopted it-assuring that federal contractual
liens will not be subject to the idiosyncracies of particular state laws.
The context provides our final reason: perfection under the UCC
provides protection to the secured creditor against later-filed claims
of other creditors; in the absence of congressional mandate or per-
suasive policy reasons to the contrary, it should similarly protect se-
cured creditors against later arising federal contractual liens.20 3
Applying the rule for perfection of liens under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 2°4 the court held Kimbell's lien to be "first in time" and
therefore "first in right."
Kimbell provides convincing reasons for rejecting the choate lien
doctrine. It then fashions a rule which is more equitable than the
choate lien doctrine, and capable of being applied uniformly among all
but one of the fifty states. 20 5 However the rule, because it relies on the
U.C.C., does present one important disadvantage. The rules for
200. Id. at 502.
201. See United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965); In re Lehigh Valley
Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
202. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
203. 557 F.2d at 503 (footnotes and citations omitted). The court does not cite the sections of
the U.C.C. to which it is referring. Presumably it is referring to sections 9-302 through 9-306.
204. Hereinafter abbreviated as U.C.C.
205. U.C.C. Article Nine covering secured transactions has been adopted by every state except
Louisiana.
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perfecting a lien under the U.C.C. apply only where interests are se-
cured by personalty.20 6 Therefore, the rule in Kimbell is applicable
only where the competing liens are attached to personalty. This signifi-
cantly narrows the number of instances where the Kimbell rule might
be applied because the rule will have no precedential value where the
competing liens are secured by realty. As Kimbell demonstrates, there
are a number of strong arguments for abandoning the choate lien doc-
trine;20 7 the more difficult inquiry concerns its replacement.
20 8
The Crittenden Opinion
In United States v. Crittenden ,209 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit carried its reasoning in Kimbell one step further by rejecting
"the first in time is the first in right ' 210 rule as well as the choate lien
doctrine. Again the court had facts before it which facilitated the adop-
tion of an alternative to the federal common law rule. From 1970 to
1972, Bridges, "the impecunious one,"'1 1 had received several loans
from the Farmers Home Administration.212 Under the terms of an
agreement executed on February 2, 1972, the loans were secured by an
interest in Bridge's crops and certain personalty, including a tractor.
Notice of the security agreement was filed on that date. On several
occasions between December 29, 1972, and December 21, 1973, Bridges
took his tractor to Crittenden for repairs. On December 21, after
Bridges failed to pay his earlier bills, Crittenden retained possession of
the tractor. In March, 1974, when Bridges filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy, Crittenden took possession of the tractor as bailee by writ of
execution. At the time of Bridges' discharge in bankruptcy, he owed
more than $7,000 to the FmHA and more than $2,000 to Crittenden.
The tractor was valued at $5,000.
The facts in Crittenden allowed the court to consider two impor-
tant factors not present in Kimbell. First, since the FmHA lien was
perfected before Crittenden's lien came into existence, and would nec-
essarily be first in time no matter what standard was used for perfecting
Crittenden's interest, Crittenden's interest could not be superior unless
both the choate lien doctrine and "the first in time, first in right" rule
were rejected. Second, Crittenden's lien was possessory, placing it
206. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37). This definition of security interest is confined to personalty.
207. See text accompanying notes 298-329 infra.
208. See text accompanying notes 331-33 infra.
209. 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977).
210. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
211. 563 F.2d at 680.
212. Hereinafter referred to as FmHA.
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squarely within one of the superpriority exceptions of section 6323(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
213
The United States, in support of its interest, argued that the priori-
ties should be measured by the federal common law rule. It further
argued that any reference by analogy to the Tax Lien Act 214 was mis-
conceived since Congress did not intend that the Act be applied to fed-
eral non-tax liens. The court rejected the government's arguments. It
reasoned that the Act was applicable by analogy since the Act had a
"consanguinity" 215 with the problem under discussion. The court
stated, "In the creativity of law we are not forbidden, in fact we are
encouraged, to look to statutes in the area of discussion in order to flesh
out congressional attitude and philosophy .... ,,216 The court then
noted that if the federal lien had been a tax lien, Crittenden's lien
would have been entitled to superpriority status under Code section
6323(b)(5). 217 Therefore, it concluded that the Act removed the "juris-
prudential underpinnings" 21 8 for any argument that the first in time
rule was applicable in protecting the federal government's non-tax lien
under the facts in the case.
219
Having rejected the common law rule, the court was free to fash-
ion its own federal rule. It analyzed two alternative sources, state
law220 and the Uniform Commercial Code.221 State law was attractive
because a person holding a security interest in property might be justi-
fied in thinking that state law governed his rights. It would be unfair if
he subsequently learned that his lien was junior to a competing federal
lien because the priority was not controlled by state law. The court was
sensitive to this policy consideration. Nonetheless it chose U.C.C. § 9-
310 as its "model for the creation of an analogous federal common law
rule . . ,"222 because it would not thwart the reasonable expectation
213. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(5).
214. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
215. 563 F.2d at 686.
216. Id. at 686-87.
217. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(5) provides:
Even though notice of a lien . . . has been filed, such lien shall not be valid-
(5) With respect to tangible personal property subject to a lien under local law se-
curing the reasonable price of the repair or improvement of such property, as against a
holder of such a lien, if such holder is, and has been, continuously in possession of such
property from the time such lien arose.
218. 563 F.2d at 687.
219. Id. at 688.
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-310 (1963). The court noted that because of inconsistencies in
the applicable Georgia law, it could not determine whether Crittenden's lien was entitled to super-
priority status under state law. See 563 F.2d at 688 n.17.
221. U.C.C. § 9-310.
222. 563 F.2d at 689. U.C.C. § 9-310 provides:
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of mechanic's lienors, it was generally uniform among the states, and it
was appropriately protective of mechanic's lienors.223 The court rea-
soned that "the prior secured creditor's interests are not prejudiced by
granting the mechanic's lien superpriority status because the value of
the secured party's collateral is usually enhanced by at least the amount
of the lien."
224
As in the case of Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank,225
the court was fortunate to have a ready-made alternative available
under the U.C.C.226 Like Kimbell, Crittenden is helpful only where the
competing interests are in personalty. If the mechanic's lien had been
attached to realty, the court would have had to construct its own rule,
since there is no uniform law regarding the priority of interests in re-
alty.
The Majority Position-Chicago Title
Insurance Co. v. Sherred Village Associates
Since 1966 several federal courts of appeals-the First,227 Sec-
ond, 228 Fourth,229 Seventh, 230 and Tenth23 1 Circuits-have held that
the federal common law rule still governs the priority of federal non-
tax liens. A recent First Circuit case, Chicago Title Insurance Co. v.
Sherred Village Associates,232 restates most of the arguments raised in
favor of its retention.
In Sherred Village, the court of appeals adjudicated the priority
between a mortgage lien held by the Department of Housing and Ur-
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or materials with
respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such
person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a
perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides
otherwise.
223. 563 F.2d at 687. The court quoted U.C.C. § 9-310, Comment I, which states that "liens
securing claims arising from work intended to enhance or preserve the value of the collateral take
priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected."
224. 563 F.2d at 687.
225. See text accompanying notes 192-208 supra.
226. See text accompanying notes 205-08 supra.
227. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (lst Cir. 1978).
228. United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1972).
229. H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1967).
This case concerned competing liens attached to the property of an insolvent debtor. Thus the
court applied a stricter test in determining choateness. Id. at 168. See also text accompanying
notes 103-23 supra.
230. Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1978).
231. T.H. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
232. 568 F.2d 217 (Ist Cir. 1978).
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ban Development 233 and a mechanic's lien. In 1971, Hercoform, Inc.
had contracted to supply materials and labor to the developer of a
moderate income residential housing project. In 1972, the developer
had obtained mortgage financing for the project from the New England
Merchants Bank. The loan was insured by HUD in accordance with its
authority under section 236 of the National Housing Act. 234 Chicago
Title Insurance insured the developer's title in the mortgaged property
for the benefit of the mortgagee bank. Hercoform recorded its mechan-
ic's lien upon completion of its work in 1973, and immediately filed suit
on its claim. In 1974, the developer defaulted on its note to the mortga-
gee bank, and the bank, pursuant to its rights under the agreement with
HUD, assigned the mortgage to HUD. The bank warranted to HUD
that the mortgage would have priority over all liens filed subsequent to
the date on which the mortgage was initially executed. Chicago Title
also insured the bank's warranty to HUD. Under state law Hercoform
clearly had priority over HUD's mortgage since its contract with the
developer had been executed before the bank's mortgage.235 In antici-
pation of the state court judgment foreclosing Hercoform's lien, Chi-
cago Title sought a declaratory judgment 236 stating that HUD's lien
was entitled to priority.
The court began its inquiry by noting that the federal courts of
appeals were "split on the issue of whether the doctrine of choateness
should continue to be applied in priority disputes involving non-tax
federal liens. ' 237 It listed the reasons given by previous courts for up-
holding the doctrine:
(1) [T]he Tax Act on its face and in its legislative history is limited in
scope to federal tax liens, (2) Congress was aware of lower federal
court decisions extending choateness to cases involving non-tax fed-
eral liens and, therefore, would have acted in these other areas too if
it had intended that choateness no longer be applied there, (3) the
Tax Act of 1966 is merely the latest in a series of Acts "designed to
effect precisely limited expansions of categories of secured creditors
protected from secret federal tax liens", and (4) Congress ... is bet-
ter equipped than the judiciary to gauge the impact of a decision to
waive the priority to which federal non-tax liens are generally enti-
tled now.2
38
The court then reviewed the arguments for abandoning the doctrine.
Although the court admitted that the arguments were persuasive, it
233. Hereinafter referred to as HUD.
234. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(j) (1976).
235. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 3251 (Supp. 1978).
236. The declaratory judgment was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
237. 568 F.2d at 220.
238. Id. at 220-21.
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concluded that it could not create its own rule.239
The court gave several reasons for retaining the doctrine. First, it
hoped that by adding another federal circuit court of appeals to the
already existing majority 240 favoring the doctrine, it would stimulate
Congressional action.241 Second, the judges felt that there was much
they did not know "about the equities, effects of various rules, and rela-
tive ability of federal and local lienors to protect themselves." 242 Ques-
tions such as "whether priority of federal liens should be subject to the
impermanent policy decisions of state legislatures" and "to what extent
participation by private financial institutions . . . is dependent upon a
rule favoring federal liens" 243 the court felt could be better answered by
Congress after Congressional hearings, rather than by a court after
hearing a limited number of litigants. Finally, unlike the courts in Kim-
bell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank244 and United States v.
Crittenden,245 the First Circuit did not have generally recognized rules
such as those found in the U.C.C. available to apply to interests in
realty. The court rejected recourse to state law and criticized the result
in Ault v. Harris246 for its lack of uniformity.
247
Sherred Village represents the most carefully reasoned defense of
the choate lien doctrine. Nonetheless, two out of the three reasons it
gives for retaining the doctrine are suspect. The first, that a decision
supporting the doctrine would attract the attention of Congress, is high-
ly speculative. 248 The second, that the court felt incompetent to create
new law in the area is equally unconvincing. The court gave two exam-
ples of questions which could be better answered by Congress. How-
ever, neither question should present much difficulty for a court. First
it asked "whether priority of federal liens should be subject to the im-
239. Id. at 221.
240. See note 12 supra.
241. 568 F.2d at 221.
242. Id.
243. Id. n.6.
244. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 192-208 supra.
245. 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 209-26 supra.
246. 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), aIf'dsub nom. Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th
Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
247. 568 F.2d at 222. The court stated:
Recourse to the local law governing mechanics' liens.., would incoorate many local
eccentricities. This fact led the Ninth Circuit in Ault, supra, to adopt the rule of the Tax
Act, Ze., adopting local law except where the mechanic's lienor has not commenced work
prior to the recordation of the federal lien. Application of this rule, though, would not
only require HUD to concern itself with the varying state laws, but would require con-
tractors to be aware of the possible applicability of two sets of rules.
248. It hardly seems reasonable that a court should base its decision, even in part, upon the
hope that the Congress might be compelled to act where the split in the circuits is 6-2 as opposed
to 5-3.
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permanent policy decisions of state legislatures. '249 Other courts have
not hesitated to answer this question. Most courts have been influ-
enced by the need for uniform rules. Even the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which rejected the first in time rule, was
careful to substitute a rule uniform among the states. 250 It is obvious
that a federal agency such as HUD would be greatly inconvenienced if
it had to contend with a different and impermanent priority rule for
each state.2 5' The other question better directed to Congress was "to
what extent participation by private financial institutions, a primary
goal of the National Housing Act, is dependent upon a rule favoring
federal liens."' 252 Again the answer seems clear. Mortgages signed pur-
suant to a HUD regulatory agreement 253 are insured mortgages. A pri-
vate financial institution is not concerned with the fate of its mortgage
once its interest is assigned or sold to HUD. Thus there is no reason
why its participation should be contingent upon a rule favoring or dis-
favoring federal liens. Neither of the issues proposed by the court
seems particularly difficult to resolve, or in need of Congress' investiga-
tory resources. They are issues for which the courts seem capable of
formulating their own rules.
The Sherred Village court's final reason for retaining the choate
lien doctrine, that it anticipated difficulties in adopting an alternative
rule, 254 is a legitimate concern. Given the nature of the competing liens
in Sherred Village, there was no pre-existing uniform rule such as those
existing under the U.C.C.,255 which could be utilized to establish the
priority of Hercoform's mechanic's lien. Hercoform's lien attached to
realty, not personalty. This necessitated a judicially created rule. The
court assumed that any rule would have to be applied uniformly re-
gardless of the law of the state in which the secured property was lo-
cated. This is a valid assumption because state laws regarding the
priority of mechanic's liens vary and are always subject to change
within a given state.25 6 The absence of a uniform rule would unduly
burden an agency such as HUD with the need to be aware of these
249. 568 F.2d at 221 n.6.
250. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes
209-26 supra.
251. See text accompanying notes 331-33 infra.
252. 568 F.2d at 221 n.6.
253. A HUD regulatory agreement is signed by the mortgagor, mortgagee and HUD. In such
an agreement HUD insures the mortgage for the total amount advanced by the mortgagee. If the
mortgagor defaults on his payments, the mortgagee may assign the mortgage to HUD. See 24
C.F.R. § 236.255 (1977).
254. 568 F.2d at 222.
255. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-310.
256. See text accompanying notes 278-95 infra.
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differences and changes, and the necessity of governing its operations
accordingly.
GOVERNING PRIORITY BETWEEN A HUD MORTGAGE LIEN
AND A MECHANIC'S LIEN
No court has formulated an alternative to the rule that "first in
time is the first in right, ' 257 and its corollary, the choate lien doctrine,
where the competing interests are secured by realty, except by relying
on the law of the state in which the realty is located. 2 8 Such reliance
results in a rule which is problematical because of its lack of uniform-
ity. Developing a uniform alternative rule is difficult because interests
in realty are not governed by a set of statutes, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code, which are common to most jurisdictions. Thus, un-
less Congress acts, any alternative rule will be entirely judicially cre-
ated. It can only be developed after a careful examination of the
nature of the competing interests.
A priority contest between a HUD mortgage lien and a mechanic's
lien is one example of a contest where the competing liens are attached
to realty. Potentially the priority contest arises whenever HUD insures
a loan secured by a mortgage that is attached to land and buildings
upon which the mechanic's lienor is working. Before formulating an
alternative rule, it is necessary to carefully examine how the lien inter-
ests arise, at what point in time they arise, whether the present majority
rule creates a fair priority, and if not, what policy considerations and
other factors must be considered in adopting a new rule.
How the Interests of the Parties Involved Arise
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
The Department of Housing and Urban Development was orga-
nized in 1965.259 However, it is comprised of agencies such as the Fed-
eral Housing Administration whose origins date back as far as 1934.260
One of the purposes of HUD is to provide "a decent home and a suita-
ble living environment for every American family."' 26' One way it ac-
complishes this purpose is through assistance in providing adequate
257. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
258. Hayden v. Prevatte, 327 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1968); Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D.
Alas. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
259. See Department of Housing and Urban Development Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (1976).
260. See National Housing Act of 1934, Act of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 1246.
261. See H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2873, 2877.
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housing for low and middle income persons, 262 principally through low
interest loans, 263 subsidies, 264 and mortgage insurance for private inves-
tors.
265
The FHA remains the agency responsible for administering the
various mortgage insurance programs. In general they may be divided
into single family266 and multifamily programs, 267 one of which, sec-
tion 236 of the National Housing Act,2 6 8 was under scrutiny in Chicago
Title Insurance Co. v. Sherred Village Associates.269 Although the sub-
stance of particular multifamily programs is obviously different, the
procedure under which the FHA operates is basically the same for most
multifamily programs. 270  Thus conclusions drawn regarding HUD-
FHA's priority as a mortgage insurer under section 236 are applicable
to its position under most multifamily mortgage insurance programs.
Section 236 is designed to provide new or rehabilitated rental
housing for lower income families and for elderly or handicapped per-
sons.27I As originally enacted, its aim was to "stimulate subsidized
housing production by making private enterprise the primary vehicle
for providing shelter for low- and moderate-income families. 272 It in-
cludes not only mortgage insurance but a subsidy paid to the mortga-
gee on behalf of the mortgagor, thereby lowering the mortgagor's
actual interest on his loan to one percent. 273 The savings are then
passed on to the tenants of the project. Eligible mortgagors are re-
stricted to limited-dividend corporations,274 nonprofit entities, and
builders who intend to ultimately sell their project to a nonprofit inves-
tor.275 The processing procedure under section 236 is complex. Its de-
tails illustrate the care with which HUD scrutinizes its allocations and
show how HUD's interest arises.
A developer's first contact with HUD is a pre-feasibility confer-
262. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 236, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-i (1976).
263. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 513, 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1976).
264. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 236, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l (1976).
265. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 231, 12 U.S.C. § 1715v (1976).
266. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 235, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1976).
267. See, e.g., National Housing Act § 207, 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (1976). This note will only con-
sider multifamily programs. One such program codified at section 236 of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976), will be analyzed.
268. National Housing Act § 236, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976).
269. 568 F.2d 217 (1st Cir. 1978).
270. Hots. & DEV. REP. (BNA) § 20:1011.
271. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(j)(6) (1976).
272. Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) § 20:0525
273. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(c) (1976).
274. A limited-dividend corporation is profit motivated but cannot earn more than six percent
annually on its equity investment. See Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) § 3:0004.
275. See generall, C. EDSON & B. LANE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO Low-MODERATE INCOME
HOUSING 2.5-2.6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as EDSON & LANE].
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ence. At that time the developer must have either purchased or have
an option to purchase the land upon which the project will be built. He
must also have such basic information as the number of units and the
prospective rental income from the project. From this information
HUD determines whether the project is economically feasible. The
next step is an application for a letter of feasibility. The application
(known as Form 2013)276 requires detailed information about the pro-
ject such as administrative, operating and maintenance costs. HUD
then analyzes carefully whether the rent and other income will cover
the mortgage payments. If the project appears financially sound, a fea-
sibility conference is held, and HUD sets forth its costs limitations and
target dates for the project, which the developer must accept. At this
time HUD reserves the funds necessary to complete the project.
Once the developer has received a letter of feasibility, he must, if
he has not already done so, hire an architect and contractor, and choose
a mortgagee. Using the architect's drawings and compilations, he may
submit a refined Form 2013 and a conditional commitment application.
Following HUD's conditional commitment, the architect must prepare
final plans and specifications, and a final Form 2013 is submitted with
firm figures on all items. Once HUD gives its firm commitment, the
parties are ready for the initial closing.
At the initial closing the mortgage is executed and recorded. One
of the many other documents signed at the closing is the regulatory
agreement. 277 This agreement declares HUD's endorsement for insur-
ance of the mortgage. It is also recorded. Construction cannot start
and the mortgagee normally will not advance any funds until after the
initial closing.
Once construction begins, the mortgagee disburses funds at regular
intervals; however, the reasonableness of each request by the general
contractor must be verified by the architect. Any major change orders
in construction must be approved by HUD. For each advance, there is
a retention of ten percent of the amount requested. The money re-
tained is not advanced until ninety percent of the project is completed.
When ninety-five percent of the project is completed HUD issues a per-
mit to occupy and tenants are selected. The final closing takes place
thirty days after construction has been completed. At that time HUD
issues an endorsement stating that a specific sum of money reflecting
the final mortgage figure is approved for insurance.
276. Id. at 3.102.




The point at which the mechanic's lienor fits into the development
chronology is related to the nature and priority of mechanic's liens.
The right to a mechanic's lien, unknown at common law, is statu-
tory.278 It is a claim which arises when labor or materials are supplied
for the improvement of land, and the lien attaches to the land as well as
buildings and improvements affixed to the land.279 Though the claim
arises automatically, statutes generally provide for the filing of a notice
of lien before the lien is entitled to priority against encumbrancers or
purchasers.2 80 Once the required notice has been filed, the lienor may
bring suit to enforce his lien.
The states are not consistent in their treatment of the priority of
mechanic's liens. Among the fifty states and the District of Columbia,
there are several types of statutes governing the priority between a
mechanic's lienor and a mortgagee. 28' They vary in the degree of pro-
tection afforded the mechanic's lienor.
The statutes of most states provide that a mechanic's lien will have
priority over all liens, including a mortgage lien, which attach after a
specified point in time. This point in time varies from state to state, but
it is always measured in terms of the mechanic's lienor's work. The
most commonly employed point is the commencement of work. 28 2 In
most states this does not necessarily mean the commencement of the
particular lienor's work, but rather the start of the project as a whole.
Most courts have held that work begins when there is visible excavation
or construction.
283
A few states choose a different point in time. In Washington, for
example, a mechanic's lienor has priority over all liens created after the
commencement of his particular work.2 4 Thus a materialman who
supplies fixtures near the end of a lengthy project enjoys legal advan-
tages in a state such as California which will measure his priority from
the day the work on the project in general commences. 28 5 The differ-
ence in time may be many months. Illinois has a particularly liberal
rule.2 86 It measures the priority of a lien from the day on which the
278. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 1 (1977).
279. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3128 (West 1974).
280. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13 (McKinney 1966).
281. See text accompanying notes 282-95 infra.
282. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
283. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822 (1965).
284. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.050 (Supp. 1977).
285. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
286. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 16 (1977).
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lienor enters into a contract to supply labor or materials. This could be
several months before the project commences.
There are several important variations in the statutes. A few states
distinguish between liens which may be satisfied from the value of the
land, and those which may be satisfied from the value of buildings and
other appurtenances attached to the land. The statute in Alabama,
287
for example, provides that a mechanic's lien has priority against the
value of both the land and appurtenances where the competing lien
attaches after the commencement of the work. But where the compet-
ing lien attaches prior to the commencement of the work, the mechan-
ic's lienor will have priority only as to the product of his work which is
separable from the land, building, and improvements which are subject
to the prior lien. Thus a mechanic's lienor may be in a better position
in Alabama e88 than he would be in California. 289 In California, a lien
competing with a mechanic's lien has absolute priority where it at-
taches before the commencement of work. However, in Alabama 290 a
mechanic's lienor, in the same situation, may be able to salvage some
compensation if he can show that his labor or materials are somehow
separable from the land, building, and improvements which existed
before he began work.
A second variation singles out construction mortgage liens for spe-
cial treatment. A construction mortgage lien is executed for the pur-
pose of providing funds for making improvements on a given parcel of
land. In Arkansas, for example, a general provision requires that all
mechanic's liens shall have priority over other liens, mortgages or en-
cumbrances, up to the total value of the buildings or other improv-
ments for which the mechanic's lienor supplied work, regardless of
when the mechanic's lien arises.291 However, construction mortgage
liens are distinguished from other types of mortgages. 292 They are
given priority against the value of the buildings and other improve-
ments where they arise before a mechanic's lien. A similar exception
prevails in New York.293 There a construction mortgage lien 294 has
priority over a mechanic's lien to the extent that the mortgagee ad-
287. ALA. CODE tit. 35, § 11-211 (1977).
288. Id.
289. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
290. See ALA. CODE tit. 35, § 11-211 (1977).
291. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-605 (1971).
292. Id.
293. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13 (McKinney 1966).
294. In New York a construction mortgage lien is referred to as a "building loan mortgage."
Id.
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vanced payments before the filing of the mechanic's lien.295
Determining the Appropriate Rule
In order to ascertain the rule which should be employed in deter-
mining the priority between a HUD mortgage lien and a mechanic's
lien, this analysis will consider three questions:
1) Whether the HUD mortgage lien attaches when the regulatory
agreement is signed or when HUD records its mortgage lien following
the assignment of the mortgage to HUD by the private mortgagee;
2) Whether the priority should be determined by the federal
common law rule; and,
3) If the priority should not be determined by the federal com-
mon law rule, what rule should be employed.
When HUD's Lien Arises
The first question, when the HUD mortgage lien attaches, estab-
lishes the position of HUD's lien in any competition for priority. The
answer is found by inquiry into the nature of the assignment. An as-
signment of a mortgage to HUD is an assignment of the rights and
obligations of the private mortgagee.296 HUD, in effect, steps into the
shoes of the private mortgagee. As a result of this identity, it has been
held that a federal mortgage lien resulting from a federally insured
mortgage attaches as of the date on which the federal agency agrees to
insure the mortgage. 297 Thus HUD's interest attaches on the day on
which the regulatory agreement is executed and recorded.
This rule seems to produce a fair result. It protects HUD as of the
time when it assumes contractual obligations as an insurer. A contrary
rule would require HUD to provide a benefit, namely its obligation as
an insurer under the agreement, without any corresponding protection
for the funds which it might have to advance pursuant to its obligation.
On the other hand any subsequent lienor is adequately protected by the
requirement that the regulatory agreement be executed and recorded.
It ensures that any subsequent lienor will have notice that the rights
under the mortgage might accrue at some future date to HUD.
Applicability of the Choate Lien Doctrine
The second question involves the applicability of the choate lien
295. A mortgage held by HUD is a construction mortgage lien.
296. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940).
297. United States v. Eklund, 369 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D. IU. 1974).
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doctrine to the priority contest between HUD and a mechanic's lienor.
The question can be analyzed on several levels.
At the most basic level, some doubt exists as to whether the doc-
trine should ever have been extended to non-insolvency proceedings.
The doctrine was originally stated for the purpose of determining the
federal priority in insolvency cases. 298 For the extension to be rational,
the interest of the federal government must be as worthy of the doc-
trine's almost total protection where the debtor is solvent. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that the two situations are "kindred"
matters, 299 but it has never stated why.
Presumably the application of the doctrine in the two instances
may be reconciled to the extent that both situations require protection
of the federal treasury. Where the debtor is insolvent, clearly the
United States is entitled to protection. Not all creditors will have their
claims satisfied in their entirety. Without a protective rule that guaran-
tees priority, debts owed to the United States could go unsatisfied, caus-
ing a drain on the federal treasury.
Where the debtor is solvent, there is no longer the clear cut need
for protection. The solvent debtor is capable of satisfying all of his
creditors so long as all of his assets can be used for that purpose. If the
United States holds a general lien, the claim will most likely be satis-
fied.3° ° A tax lien is a general lien. Therefore, where the United States
has a claim against a delinquent but solvent taxpayer, there is no need
for a rule which protects the federal treasury. It may be argued that the
rule facilitates prompt payment,30' since it gives the United States first
priority to liquid assets. But this is a different policy consideration
from that upon which the choate lien doctrine has been traditionally
justified in insolvency proceedings. The policy considerations behind
insuring payment of debts to the federal government are far weightier
than those behind insuring prompt payment where payment at some
point is assured.
Given the fact that a United States tax lien may not need priority
protection, it is ironic that the United States Supreme Court originally
extended the choate lien doctrine to a non-insolvency situation in a tax
lien case, United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank.30 2 It is no less
ironic that in every succeeding Supreme Court case the United States
298. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
299. See United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950).
300. A general lien attaches to all of the debtor's assets. See note 73 supra.
301. This was one of the reasons for the original extension in United States v. Security Trust &
Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950).
302. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
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was the holder of a tax lien.30 3 Nevertheless, every lower federal court
which has extended the priority to federal non-tax liens has relied
heavily upon the Supreme Court's extension in the tax lien area.3°4 No
court has questioned the logic of the extension. If there are valid rea-
sons for applying the choate lien doctrine to non-insolvency proceed-
ings, they have not been supplied by the Supreme Court.
Another basic consideration leaves open to doubt the need for a
protective rule such as the choate lien doctrine in both non-insolvency
and insolvency proceedings. This concerns the continuing validity of
the premise underlying the choate lien doctrine, namely that the federal
treasury must be protected. 305 In 1797 when Congress enacted Revised
Statute 3466,306 and in 1817 when the Supreme Court strictly construed
that statute,30 7 losses resulting from unpaid debts were more difficult to
absorb. The United States could not afford to stand in a long line of
general creditors and be paid a small percentage of its claim. The
financial position of the United States has changed significantly since
then. The federal treasury's dramatic growth eases any difficulty in ab-
sorbing losses, and the methods for raising revenue to cover losses to
the treasury are far more sophisticated.
The more secure financial position of the United States must be
juxtaposed with that of the competing private creditor. His difficulty in
absorbing losses has not changed. The federal priority was detrimental
to his financial status in 1797 and 1817, and it remains so today. More-
over, the federal government is engaged in a far greater number of ac-
tivities which give rise to a debtor/creditor relationship than in 1817.308
Thus many more private creditors are affected by the federal priority.
In addition many of these activities interface with the private sector
and are not for the purpose of raising revenue. The fairness of giving
the United States priority where it is acting just as any other private
creditor is questionable.
Obviously the policy considerations supporting a protective rule in
303. See note 74 supra.
304. See note 182 supra.
305. United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832).
306. Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515.
307. Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
308. Within the last forty-five years, Congress has created a number of administrative agencies
whose purpose is to assist and stabilize various segments of the economy. The Small Business
Administration, created in 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 633 (1976)), is one such agency. Its activities include loans to small businesses, disaster loans,
loans for water pollution control facilities, and loans to handicapped persons operating small busi-
nesses. 15 U.S.C. § 636 (1976). These activities by their nature give rise to debtor-creditor rela-
tionships. Other agencies engaged in similar programs include the Department of Housing and
Urban Development and the Farmer's Home Administration.
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the nation's formative years have changed or have been modified in the
last 150 years. It is time to assess these changes and modifications, and
redetermine whether the need for the federal priority still exists.
A second level of inquiry as to the applicability of the choate lien
doctrine concerns the importance of the Tax Lien Act 30 9 in assessing
the doctrine's current validity. The provisions of the Act clearly reject
the priority created by the doctrine in a number of different situations
where the United States is the holder of a tax lien.310 However there is
strong disagreement over the propriety of applying the reasoning be-
hind these provisions to federal non-tax liens.
Proponents of the choate lien doctrine point to the fact that the
Tax Lien Act, on its face, applies only to tax liens. 3"1 They argue that if
Congress had intended that the priorities apply to non-tax liens, it
would have enacted statutes to that effect. 312 Twelve years have passed
and Congress has not acted.
Opponents of the choate lien doctrine counter by arguing that the
Tax Lien Act removed the "jurisprudential underpinnings" 31 3 of the
doctrine. 314 Though the Act applied only to tax liens, its provisions can
be applied by analogy in other areas. They argue that the policy con-
siderations behind protecting a federal tax lien are similar to those be-
hind protecting other types of federal liens.315 Congress reasoned that
the choate lien doctrine produced inequitable results in its protection of
federal tax liens. Therefore the reasoning should apply, a fortiori, to
other federal liens where the government is not raising revenue but is
acting in a quasi-commercial capacity.
Neither set of arguments is sound. The proponents ignore the fact
that the choate lien doctrine is a judicially created rule. 31 6 As such it
may be judicially and judiciously abandoned. There is no binding pre-
cedent. The Supreme Court has adjudicated only the priority of fed-
309. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
310. See I.R.C. § 6323.
311. Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1972); T.H.
Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
312. United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d at 678-79;
T.H. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d at 18.
313. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 1977).
314. Id.; Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1975); Ault v. Harris, 317 F.
Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), affd sub nom. Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
315. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d at 686-87; Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 557 F.2d at 500; United States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d at 689; Ault v.
Harris, 317 F. Supp. at 375.
316. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 312 (1946).
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eral tax liens,317 and that priority has been eroded by the Tax Lien Act.
Some courts admit that they have the power to change the rule, and
that it should be changed, yet they fail to act.318 They rely instead on
the faint hope that Congress will act to remedy the inequities in the not
too distant future.
The arguments set forth by the opponents of the choate lien doc-
trine are specious. It is tempting to analogize from the Tax Lien Act,
but it should not be done without greater scrutiny of the interests in-
volved. A tax lien is a general lien which attaches to all of the property
of the delinquent taxpayer.319 Therefore the fact that a federal tax lien
is junior to a mechanic's lien with regard to a particular property inter-
est, which cannot satisfy both liens, does not leave the tax lien unsatis-
fied. In most cases the tax lien can be satisfied from the balance of the
taxpayer's property. If the taxpayer is insolvent, the federal govern-
ment is still protected. Revised Statute 3466320 supercedes the priorities
under Code section 6323321 and the United States is entitled to first
priority. 322 Thus a federal tax lien is protected with or without a rule
that gives it first priority.
Other federal liens such as a federal mortgage lien are not so pro-
tected. They are specific liens which attach only to a specific piece of
property. If the value of the property is insufficient to satisfy all the
attaching liens and the federal lien is junior to the other liens, the fed-
eral lien will go unsatisfied. The purpose of the choate lien doctrine is
to insure that the federal lien will be paid to the greatest extent possi-
ble. A federal mortgage lien may need this protection while a federal
tax lien clearly does not.
Thus the policy considerations behind abandoning the choate lien
doctrine are not the same for all federal liens. The approach of the
opponents, though appealing on its face, is too simplistic. This does not
mean that provisions of Code section 6323 are irrelevant in determin-
ing the priority of other federal liens, for they may help provide an
adequate solution. But they should not be applied without more rigor-
ous scrutiny than that given by courts opposing the choate lien doc-
trine.
The final level of. inquiry concerns the validity of applying the
317. See note 74 supra.
318. See Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588
(7th.Cir. 1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (Ist Cir. 1978).
319. See note 58 supra.
320. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
321. I.R.C. § 6323.
322. Cf. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970).
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choate lien doctrine to determine the priority of a mortgage lien held
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It has been
seen that the rationale behind applying the doctrine for the benefit of
any federal lien is suspect for at least two reasons. First, the United
States Supreme Court has never given an adequate explanation for ex-
tending the use of the doctrine from insolvency to non-insolvency pro-
ceedings. 323 Second, in view of the changes in the financial position of
the United States during the last 150 years, the application of the doc-
trine in both insolvency and non-insolvency proceedings is questiona-
ble.324 Some courts, in determining the applicability of the choate lien
doctrine to a particular federal non-tax lien, have analogized to provi-
sions of the Tax Lien Act. 325 However, the provisions of the Act cannot
be applied without careful examination of the policy consideration be-
hind protecting that lien.326 Thus it is necessary to examine the policy
considerations behind protecting a HUD mortgage lien.
The need for protecting a federal tax lien provides a helpful com-
parison in determining the applicability of the Act. The retention of
the choate lien doctrine as it applies to a HUD mortgage lien is valid to
the extent that the need for protecting the HUD mortgage lien is
greater than the need for protecting a federal tax lien. If the need for
protecting a federal tax lien is greater, then, a fortiori, the provisions of
the Act may be applied to a HUD mortgage lien. It has already been
acknowledged that a HUD mortgage lien, as a specific lien, could po-
tentially go unsatisfied, whereas a federal tax lien, under almost any set
of circumstances, eventually will be satisfied. 327 This indicates that the
mortgage lien is in greater need of protection. But there are a number
of other considerations which tend at least to equalize the need.
First, HUD has the opportunity to choose its debtors while the
United States as a tax lienor cannot. HUD can protect itself by choos-
ing the developer or owner of the land whose mortgage it insures. It
does, in fact, take advantage of this opportunity by requiring the mort-
gagor to submit to an extensive and comprehensive application proce-
dure.328 HUD will not insure a mortgage unless it is convinced that the
project is sound. In addition HUD protects itself to some degree by
requiring the mortgagee to withhold ten percent of each disbursal until
323. See text accompanying notes 298-304 supra.
324. See text accompanying notes 305-08 supra.
325. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
326. See text accompanying notes 309-22 supra.
327. See text accompanying notes 319-22 supra.
328. See text accompanying notes 276-77 supra.
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the project is nearly completed. This lessens by ten percent the amount
of any lien in case the project should fail before completion.
The United States, on the other hand, cannot choose the person or
entity that fails to pay its taxes. As a result, the IRS is often forced to
collect from a delinquent taxpayer who is having financial problems.
He is solvent, but his assets are not easily liquidated. Where other par-
ties have an interest in his property, disbursement of funds from the
sale of that property must be settled through litigation. If the United
States is not given priority over other claimants, it will be entitled to a
smaller share of the property to which its lien attaches. As a result it is
likely that the United States will have to foreclose on more of the tax-
payer's property than if it were entitled to first priority. This could
require more litigation and greater expenses than would otherwise be
necessary.
Second, HUD, unlike the IRS, operates on a commercial basis,
insuring mortgages somewhat like any other commercial lender. It en-
ters into contracts and therefore can control, to some extent, its rights
and obligations. It does not insure high risk projects, but rather those
projects which it is reasonably certain will be successful. It seems un-
fair that HUD should be entitled to a priority which is unavailable to
private lending institutions acting in the same capacity.
Third, the federal priority may discourage potential creditors of
the mortgagor. A mechanic's lienor, for example, will be less likely to
contract with a developer whose mortgage is being insured by HUD,
because he knows that with the federal government as a claimant, he
will lose the priority advantages he enjoys under state law. If he does
contract to provide his services, he may charge a premium for those
services because of the additional risk involved.
Finally, the federal government's role as a collector of taxes is far
more central to the functioning of our country than is its role as an
insurer of mortgages. The raising of revenue is a function upon which
all other federal agencies rely for their funds. An obstacle to or even a
delay in the raising of revenue must necessarily have repercussions in
all areas of federal activity. The insuring of mortgages, while it is an
important part of our national housing program, does not occupy such
a central position.
Balancing the various policy considerations, it becomes clear that
if a federal tax lien is not given the protection of the choate lien doc-
trine, then a HUD mortgage lien should be denied its protection as
well. The conclusion becomes even stronger in view of the questiona-
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ble reasoning behind the choate lien doctrine. 329 The question remains,
however, as to whether the doctrine should apply where the competing
lien is a mechanic's lien. Internal Revenue Code sections 6323(a) and
6323(h)(2) 330 specifically determine the priority between a mechanic's
lien and a federal tax lien. The statute supercedes the choate lien doc-
trine, and the doctrine is therefore inapplicable where the federal lien is
a tax lien. Since a HUD mortgage lien is no more in need of protection
than a federal tax lien, it follows that the doctrine should likewise not
be applied to determine the priority between a HUD mortgage lien and
a mechanic's lien.
Considerations in Formulating the Proposed
Alternative Rule
The problem in formulating an alternative to the federal common
law rule is choosing an equitable rule which will not be too difficult to
apply. An equitable rule should be considerate of the competing inter-
ests involved. It should create a rule of priority the application of
which will effect a result which most closely reflects the real interests of
the parties in the property. Thus the rule should consider the value of
the advances made by HUD or its assignor. It should also reflect the
fact that the mechanic's lienor has improved the property. The value of
the improvement should not accrue solely to the benefit of HUD, a
result the choate lien doctrine would compel.
Difficulty in application refers to the problem of uniformity. Ide-
ally the rule which is proposed should be capable of application uni-
formly among the states. If, for example, the rule was dependent on
the law of the state in which the property interest was located, HUD
would be forced to concern itself with many different rules. Burdening
HUD with a myriad of rules should be avoided if possible. If there are
other workable alternatives which avoid adopting state law, they would
be preferable.
From the standpoint of uniformity the best proposal would be the
329. See text accompanying notes 298-304 supra.
330. I.R.C. § 6323(a) provides that:
The [tax] lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder
of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof
which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary or his
delegate.
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(2) provides:
The term "mechanic's lienor" means any person who under local law has a lien on
real property (or on the proceeds of a contract relating to real property) for services,
labor, or materials furnished in connection with the construction or improvement of such
property. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a person has a lien on the earliest date
such lien becomes valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without actual
notice, but not before he begins to furnish the services, labor, or materials.
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uniform application of the law found in the majority of states-the
mechanic's lienor has priority over all liens which arise subsequent to
the commencement of work.331 However, this rule would do little to
help the mechanic's lienor in a contest with a HUD lien since work
usually is not commenced until after the signing of the regulatory
agreement, which is the time when HUD's lien arises. Thus in almost
every case a mechanic's lien would be junior to a HUD mortgage lien.
Any proposal which establishes a specific point in time, such as the
commencement of work, after which the mechanic's lien is entitled to
priority, will suffer from the same inequitable result. Depending on the
point in time which is chosen, the HUD mortgage lien, which always
arises when the regulatory agreement is signed,332 will be entitled either
to absolute priority over the entire value of the project or to no priority
at all. Most FHA insured multifamily projects develop according to a
similar pre-planned sequence of events. 333 Any event chosen to meas-
ure the mechanic's lienor's priority, depending on its position in the
sequence of events, will always be before the signing of the regulatory
agreement or always after the signing of the agreement. Such a result
does not reflect, in either case, the real interest of the competing liens in
the property.
Clearly the proposed rule must strike a balance between the com-
peting interests. A rule that produces an all or nothing result is unfair
to the lien that is deemed to be junior, for both liens have a stake in the
property. The mechanic's lienor supplies labor or materials which in-
crease the value of the property. HUD reimburses the private mortga-
gee in an amount equal to the sum of the advances made by the private
mortgagee. HUD may also make advances out of its own funds. Thus
each lienor should be entitled to priority over the value of some seg-
ment of the property.
The Proposed Alternative Rule
The current approach should be replaced by the following rules:
1) If a laborer or materialman contracts to supply labor or
materials to a housing project prior to the signing of a HUD regulatory
agreement and the owner or developer has reason to know that his
mortgage may be insured by HUD, the owner or developer must notify
the laborer or materialman of that possibility prior to signing of the
contract. If a laborer or materialman contracts to supply labor or
331. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
332. See text accompanying notes 296-97 supra.
333. See text accompanying notes 270-77 supra.
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materials after the signing of a HUD regulatory agreement, then the
filing of the regulatory agreement will be sufficient notice.
2) If a laborer or materialman is not given notice pursuant to the
provisions of section one, then his priority as a mechanic's lienor will
be governed by state law.
3) If the laborer or materialman has received notice that the
owner's or developer's mortgage may be or will be insured by HUD,
then HUD has priority over the value of the property prior to the com-
mencement of that particular laborer's or materialman's work. The
mechanic's lienor has priority over the value of all improvements made
upon the land subsequent to the commencement of his particular work.
The first provision insures that the mechanic's lienor is given suffi-
cient notice that his priority will be determined by the federal common
law and not state statute. With this notice he may decide to reject the
contract or charge a premium if the federal common law rule provides
an additional risk.
The second section provides a remedy in case the mechanic's lie-
nor does not receive notice. In order to protect itself, HUD should re-
quire some evidence that the developer or owner has given sufficient
notice to all laborers and materialmen already under contract before it
signs the regulatory agreement. Otherwise HUD's priority will be gov-
erned by a state statute which is less protective of its interest.
The final provision establishes the priorities. It creates a priority
in favor of HUD, to the extent of the value of the property before a
particular mechanic's lienor commences his work. This is fair to the
mechanic's lienor because he has no interest in the property until he
commences his work. The mechanic's henor, on the other hand, is
given priority over the value of all improvements made on the land
after he commences work, not just his own. This insures that his lien
will be fully satisfied even when the subsequently determined value of
his work is less than his actual expenses.
Under the proposed rule if any lien must go unsatisfied, it will
necessarily be HUD's lien. Where one party must suffer a loss, it is
preferable that the loss burden the party which can best absorb that
loss. If the mechanic's lienor were to suffer the loss, it would be felt by
one individual or business. Where HUD suffers the loss it is felt by a
large federal agency, and eventually is spread among the millions of
taxpayers whose tax dollars support the work of HUD. The loss is part
of the cost of providing adequate housing at a reasonable price for
thousands of American families.
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CONCLUSION
Twelve years have passed since Congress enacted the Tax Lien
Act.334 Since then, a number of courts have had the opportunity to
finish "the unfinished business" 335 by devising more equitable and pro-
gressive rules governing the priority of federal non-tax liens. The ma-
jority of courts have chosen not to act. Instead they have applied the
choate lien doctrine, often without giving adequate reasons for doing
so. Thus the "business" remains "unfinished." It is time that the
archaic choate lien doctrine be laid to rest, for its application produces
unfair results. If Congress does not act, this should not excuse the
courts, for they are fully capable of fashioning new law in the area.




After this note went to press, the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in two consolidated cases, United States v. Kim-
bell Foods, Inc. (afj'g Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank)
and United States v. Crittenden. 47 U.S.L.W. 4342 (April 2, 1979). In
Kimbell, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In
Crittenden, the Court vacated the decision of the lower court and re-
manded the case for an application of state priority rules, rejecting the
special federal commercial law rule applied by the lower court.
334. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
335. Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorties-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 228
(1967).

